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R E V I E W S E C T I O N
Nature/Nurture Revisited I:
A REVIEW OF THE BIOLOGICAL BASES OF CONFLICT
STEPHEN D. NELSON
Institute for Social Research
University of Michigan
Biologically oriented approaches to the study of human conflict have thus far
been limited largely to the study of aggression. A sample of the literature on this
topic is reviewed, drawing upon four major approaches: comparative psychology,
ethology (including some popularized accounts), evolutionary-based theories, and
several areas of human physiology. More sophisticated relationships between so-called
"innate" and "acquired" determinants of behavior are discussed, along with the
proper relevance of animal behavior studies for human behavior. Unless contained in
a comprehensive theory which includes social and psychological variables, biolog-
ically oriented theories (although often valid within their domain) offer at best
severely limited and at worst highly misleading explanations of complex social
conflicts. The review concludes with a list of several positive contributions of these
biological approaches and suggests that social scientists must become more
knowledgeable about them.
Until recently, social scientists-including those interested in social
conflict-have been able to ignore with impunity biological approaches to
social and political phenomena. Perhaps it is a measure of the lack of
cross-disciplinary communication that so many of us could have consid-
ered the spate of best-selling books by Konrad Lorenz, Robert Ardrey,
Desmond Morris, and Lionel Tiger a mere passing fad. In fact, they were
the popularized tip of a very serious iceberg, for there has been emerging
over the past decade or two a growing set of interrelated fields which have
developed biologically based theories of human behavior, steadily spread-
ing into the social sciences, with apparent relevance for the study of
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conflict. Such fields as ethology, neuropsychology, psychopharmacology,
behavior genetics, evolutionary genetics, and physical anthropology are
finding increasing application in areas of the social sciences where social,
political, historical, and psychological concepts have traditionally held
sway.
In various ways and to different degrees, these fields share Dennis
Wrong’s (1963: 78) conviction that &dquo;we must start with the recognition
that in the beginning there is the body.&dquo; But, Wrong continues, speaking
of his own discipline, &dquo;as soon as the body is mentioned the specter of
’biological determinism’ raises its head and sociologists draw back in
fright.&dquo; Sociologists have not been alone, but the reactions to the
biological work have been not so much fear as either carefully reasoned
argument or rhetorical hysteria, as well as a variety of intermediate
responses. For the dialogue has stirred up the old &dquo;nature-nurture&dquo;
controversy again, this time in more sophisticated form. While both sides
now agree that the old form of the controversy is dead and that human
behavior is the result of complex interactions between both biological
givens and environmental influences, &dquo;the extent of disagreement about
the modes of interaction and the weight to be given to different elements
involved is so sharp and extensive as to constitute almost a ’nature-
advocate’-’nurture-advocate’ polarity, with a variety of intermediate posi-
tions located on the intervening continuum&dquo; (Willhoite, 1971: 620).
However, all writers, regardless of their predilections, agree on the
importance of the issue: that our survival as a species, or the form that
survival takes, depends upon our understanding far better than we do now
the nature of human beings and the determinants of their behavior
(Eisenberg, 1972).
The entree of biological approaches to human conflict is by means of
the concept of aggression. This review, therefore, must be at once both
narrower and broader than my title implies-narrower because the
biologically oriented literature focuses almost entirely on aggression, and
this concept is only one small part, theoretically speaking, of conflict; and
broader because often theoretical and methodological principles that apply
to behavior in general must be clarified. (Wherever possible, I will try to
broaden the discussion to considerations of conflict, not just aggression.)
However, the biological literature even on aggression alone is enormous,
and, as a result, in order to acquaint the reader with the breadth and scope
of these approaches, some depth of review must be sacrificed. Consequent-
ly, the coverage of some material will seem sketchy, shallow, and abrupt.
In evaluating the biological approaches, I have tried to be sympathetic but
critical. I see my role not as one of merely passing facts and ideas
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uncritically on to the reader, but rather of pointing out both strengths and
weaknesses of both the biologically oriented approaches and those of their
critics.
Trying to define aggression is often difficult and confusing. Many uses
of the term &dquo;utterly mix cause and effect, symbol and reality, fact and
value&dquo; (Davies, 1970: 612). Further, there is little agreement on the scope
of definition. Some writers define aggression fairly narrowly (Davies,
1970; Bandura, 1973), while others define it so broadly that it nearly
becomes synonymous with &dquo;assertiveness&dquo; or &dquo;achievement-seeking&dquo;
(Storr, 1968; Corning, 1971; Willhoite, 1971). The broad defmitions have
several disadvantages. First, they require the concept to do too much, to
cover too many kinds of referents, and as a result they carry a lot of
connotative &dquo;excess baggage.&dquo; Second, they prejudge empirical questions
which demand data, rather than definitional fiats, for their resolution; for
example, whether the sources of &dquo;aggression&dquo; in the narrow sense (attack
with injury or damage intended) can, if redirected, lead to achievement
behavior, mastery of the environment, assertiveness, and so on. Third, they
are more prone to careless use and resultant confusion of cause and effect.
Davies’ (1970: 613) definition of aggression, which avoids such
difficulties, concentrates only on effects: &dquo;an act done with the intent to
injure person [s] or damage property.&dquo; (Violence is synonymous with
aggression for Davies.) He defines &dquo;aggressiveness&dquo; as &dquo;the tendency to
commit aggression, the tendency to do injury or damage.&dquo; I will follow
these definitions in this review.
It is generally agreed that, among nonhuman animals, predation is not
considered aggression. (This latter term is usually reserved for intraspecies
attacks.) However, for humans, it is often difficult to know where to draw
the line between aggressive and nonaggressive killing, or in some cases even
between predation and aggressive killing-for example, hunting for game
(Rapoport, 1965).
This review will discuss biologically oriented approaches to aggression
in the fields of comparative psychology, ethology, evolution and
evolutionary genetics, and several fields dealing with human physiology.
The applicability of these approaches to the problem of war will be
considered, and the paper will conclude with an overall evaluation of the
contributions and limitations of such approaches.
EVIDENCE FROM NONHUMAN SPECIES
In the language of nature-hating, we are informed that man is an animal
because of certain black-sheep traits, like insanity in the family closet. He
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shares with the beasts: brutality, violence, and inevitable death. Against that
’biological’ side of human nature, sensibility, compassion, language, and
spirituality are claimed as peculiarly human.... [However,] the notion
belongs to a particular history of ideas rather than to life’s immutable realities
[Shepard and McKinley, 1969: 99 ] .
It seems rather hard on other animals to project the failings of mankind upon
them, and then blame them for having bequeathed those failings to us. Yet
this kind of protective anthropomorphism ... constitutes an only too com-
mon rationalization for the deplorabilities of human behavior [Montagu,
1973a: xvi-xvii].
The belief has persisted, with varying degrees of sophistication, that the
study of &dquo;animal&dquo; (i.e., nonhuman species) behavior will somehow shed
light on human behavior. In this section, I will deal with two different
approaches to this assumption: comparative psychology and ethology.
Considerable material which is relevant to both fields-and, of course, to
human behavior-will be discussed in the latter section, so it should be
emphasized that the relative length of the two sections does not
necessarily reflect on the fields’ respective contributions. Although
technically incorrect, for ease of exposition I will frequently use the more
colloquial term &dquo;animal&dquo; to mean nonhuman species.
EVIDENCE FROM COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Traditional assumptions. Until the recent challenge by ethology,
comparative psychologists shared certain assumptions regarding
phylogeny, cross-species comparisons, behavior acquisition, and methodol-
ogy. Some of the major ones have been summarized by Lockard (1971:
169-170) in a somewhat overstated but not entirely unfair fashion, some
of which are as follows:
(1) There is a phylogenetic scale, a sort of linear arrangement from simple
to complex, from unintelligent to intelligent, from amoeba to man.
(4) Because of the scale, animals lower in the scale are increasingly simpler
but not different in kind. A white rat is a simple version of a human.
(5) Learning is the key to animal behavior because most behavior is
acquired. Hunger, thirst, sex, respiration, and a thing or two more may be built
in as initial tendencies, but these few things are merely the unconditioned
responses on which behavior is built.
(6) Because so little is built into animals, genetics and evolution are
irrelevant to psychology.
(7) Most animals are pretty much alike. Species differences are few and are
probably accounted for by sensory differences and different experiences.
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(9) Animal behavior can be studied best in the laboratory because of the
controlled conditions. Laboratory conditions simplify behavior.
Aggression and agonistic behavior in nonhuman species. As for the
frequency or ubiquity of aggression among animals, overt aggression (as
distinguished from agonistic behavior defined below) is apparently
relatively uncommon among vertebrate species (Scott, 1969; Gottier,
1972), including primates (Pilbeam, 1973; Montagu, 1973b). Usually,
attack and threat are &dquo;ritualized&dquo; (Scott, 1969; Lorenz, 1966; Gottier,
1972), so that overt fighting generally plays little part in animal social life,
although this varies by species (Scott, 1969). As for invertebrates, which
comprise 96% of all animals (Lockard, 1971), &dquo;ant wars&dquo; and fighting
among crustaceans have been noted, but &dquo;there are thousands of species of
arthropods in which fighting has never been reported&dquo; (Scott, 1969: 124).
Contrary to popular belief, humans are not the only species which kills
greatly in excess of predatory needs. Kruuk (1972) describes a number of
incidents in which different predatory animals killed far more of their prey
than they or their fellows could eat. However, such incidents are quite rare
and are thought to be explained ethologically by either the overabundance
of prey available at the time or their panic, providing an excess of stimuli
that release predatory behavior.
Animal behavior does not provide good analogies to human social
conflict because the great bulk of the overt fighting that does take place is
between individuals rather than groups, the latter being relatively rare in
most species and perhaps nonexistent in &dquo;man’s closest biological relatives,
the anthropoid apes [chimpanzees and gorillas] &dquo; (Scott, 1969: 128).
Regarding comparisons to the quintessential human conflict, Scott says:
&dquo;Of the cases [of organized group fighting] that do exist ... there is none
which provides a good analogue of human warfare, and certainly none
which can be considered a homologue.&dquo;
Although overt aggression seems to be rare, the broader category of
&dquo;agonistic behavior&dquo; is not. This is &dquo;behavior which arises from a situation
of conflict between two members of the same species&dquo; (Scott, 1969: 121),
and includes threats, bluffing, displays or postures of dominance,
submission, freezing, and escape. Such behavior apparently is intimately
connected with the establishment and maintenance of dominance hierar-
chies (Gottier, 1972; Scott, 1969).
Gottier (1972) has reviewed a great deal of the literature dealing with
factors affecting agonistic behavior in nonhuman species, including both
biological variables and learning or experiential factors. The biological
determinants considered are heritability, sex, and hormonal balance.
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(a) Heritability: There is evidence for interbreed and even intrabreed
differences in agonistic behavior by means of selective breeding, although
the evidence for the latter is somewhat contradictory. However, the
generality of these findings is uncertain, for while positive results have
been obtained by &dquo;artificial&dquo; selection in experiments, it is not clear that
in natural surroundings the most dominant males and the most dominant
females would consistently choose each other for mating.
(b Sex: The expectation that males are more aggressive than females
and always dominate them in the status order has received only partial and
highly qualified support. Dominance has been found to be unrelated to sex
in several species (e.g., cats, rats, monkeys), while in others (e.g., the
domestic chicken) there are separate dominance hierarchies for males and
females, with little hierarchy-relevant agonistic interaction between them.
For the many vertebrate species in which males are more aggressive than
females, two determinants have been suggested (Scott, 1958): greater
amounts of androgen in males (see below), and superior size, which &dquo;may
operate as much as a perceptual learning factor as it does in giving an
advantage of strength&dquo; (Gottier, 1972: 185).
(cJ Hormonal influences: Hormonal modification, principally andro-
gen, appears to enhance aggressiveness and position in the dominance
hierarchy, but there are important qualifications. The injections adminis-
tered have been artificially large; the effects are considerably larger among
strangers than in already established orders; and the effects have been
either absent or considerably smaller among &dquo;higher&dquo; species-presumably,
where learned response patterns are more important.
While Gottier does not deny the importance of these biological
variables for agonistic behavior, he feels that the evidence shows that
learning or the past experience of the organism &dquo;stands out above the
others in its basic importance&dquo; (Gottier, 1972: 206). He reaches this
conclusion after reviewing supporting evidence from a number of areas,
which include the following as factors which influence agonistic behavior:
(a) evidence for learning (early experience, increased experience at competition,
&dquo;social inertia&dquo; of the dominance order even in the face of factors which
normally would modify the order, and avoidance and operant conditioning);
(b) perceptual factors (appearance of the organism, size as a &dquo;learned perceptual
factor,&dquo; and morphological modification of the organism);1 I
1. While Gottier interprets these perceptual factors in learning or experiential
terms, several of those discussed in the studies cited are also open to a biological
interpretation insofar as they may function as "sign stimuli" or "releasers" (see
definitions under "Ethology").
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(c) social factors (group stability or social disorganization, the status of
newcomers); and
(d) ecological factors (availability of food, and territoriality, the popular
assumptions of which Gottier disputes).
He concludes that &dquo;the European emphasis on an innate aggressive drive is
not nearly as important as the past experience of the organism&dquo; (Gottier,
1972: 211). However, his conclusions are certainly not shared by all
investigators (Lockard, 1971; Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Wickler, 1968), and
portions of the evidence he cites are vulnerable to ethological interpreta-
tions. Further, he deals with only a few selected species among vertebrates,
and many of the studies cited were conducted under laboratory rather
than natural conditions. As a result, all his conclusions cannot be accepted
uncritically.
Criticisms of comparative psychology. Comparative psychology and its
assumptions, cited earlier, have come under severe attack in the past two
decades, sometimes from within its own ranks and sometimes from
ethologists. The basic charge has been that its biological assumptions have
been uninformed and fundamentally wrong. Lockard (1971: 173-175) has
summarized the modern positions rebutting each of the previously cited
assumptions:
(1) There is no phylogenetic scale.... The living species of today form no
scale at all, except for partial reconstructions made with great caution and
competence within a related group....
(4) White rats are not simple versions of humans.... The place of rodents
in psychology is for the study of rodent behavior, not human behavior. Animal
behavior research can illummate human behavior m the context of the
comparative method or the ecological method; but research on animals
unrelated to humans by one of these two methods has no scientific relevance
in its results.
(5) Learning is not the key to animal behavior because most behavior is not
acquired.... The old concept of an animal as having some degree of
intelligence and thus able to learn nearly anything m accord with its
endowment is giving way to the view that natural selection has probably
produced rather specific learning mechanisms that correspond to ecological
demands.... In short, learnmg abilities may evolve as discrete entities related
to environmental particulars where they convey a reproductive advantage.
(6) Because so much is built mto annnals, genetics and evolution are of the
utmost importance to any science of behavior....
(7) Animals are quite different from species to species; each has its own
autecology and its own set of adaptations.... The old view that the same
hidden but lawful processes resided in all animals is untenable both m the face
of empirical findings and because of the independent ongm of behaviors....
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(9) The laboratory has limited usefulness and subtle disadvantages in the
study of animal behavior; a new role for the laboratory is emergmg....
sometimes the problem can be analyzed only so far [in the field], and it must
be moved into the laboratory.... Much of the history of comparative
psychology consisted of inventing clever procedures and imposing them upon
animals; today, the interest is not in what an animal can be made to do, but in
how it normally functions.2
Lockard feels that, because comparative psychology has been unable to
fulfill its promise for animal behavior research to illuminate human
behavior, it has been virtually supplanted by ethology and other more
biologically sophisticated specialties. This is an exaggeration, but many of
the older assumptions, at least in their simpler forms, appear to have been
discredited.
EVIDENCE FROM ETHOLOGY
Basic assumptions and methods. To those unfamiliar with modern
developments in the biological sciences, it may have seemed that ethology,
widely thought to have &dquo;a short history and a shaky foundation&dquo;
(Lockard, 1971: 170), had crept quietly onto the scientific scene until the
Ardrey and Lorenz books cast the harsh glare of publicity on it. In fact,
however, it is one of the more recent developments in a trend with deep
and continuous roots reaching back to Darwin’s Origin of Species, a
movement that has seen disciplinary boundaries between formerly separate
specialties collapse, uniting them and a series of newer, interdisciplinary
branches into &dquo;the modern synthesis,&dquo; with updated evolutionary con-
cepts at the heart of the synthesis (Lockard, 1971). Ethology’s contribu-
tion has been to provide a rationale for bringing the study of behavior into
that synthesis. And if social scientists have been harboring any residual
doubts about whether ethology has &dquo;arrived,&dquo; the recent awarding of the
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine to Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen,
and Karl von Frisch, the fathers of ethology, should dispel them.
There seem to be various, not entirely consistent definitions of
ethology. The one most frequently encountered recently is &dquo;the biology of
behavior,&dquo; or &dquo;behavioral biology,&dquo; although some writers (e.g., Barnett,
1973) refer to it as &dquo;the science of animal behavior.&dquo; Willhoite (1971:
619) summarizes its attraction: &dquo;The main promise that ethology seems to
hold out to students of society and politics is the possibility of developing
a scientifically defensible conception of man’s nature.&dquo; The expectation is
premature, as we shall see, but ethology has captured the imagination of a
2. Boice (1973: 6) states: "The complex learning processes evidenced by animals
in a laboratory are probably not primarily the result of Darwinian evolution. They
are, rather, the result of captivity, boredom, playfulness, and domestication."
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number of behavioral scientists and seems to be finding increasing
application to problems of human behavior.
The basic assumption of ethology is that all organisms, including
humans, are products of evolution in which &dquo;fitness&dquo; for survival in an
ecological niche is determined by an interaction of mutation and natural
selection. They believe that, in addition to physical characteristics,
genetically transmitted behavior patterns have been fashioned by natural
selection. Hunt (1973: 29) perhaps oversimplifies when he says: &dquo;The
basic tenet of ethology is that by far the largest part of what
animals-including man-do is instinctive,&dquo; for different ethologists would
agree or disagree to varying degrees with different portions of his
statement.
Nevertheless, the primary focus is on the biological bases of behavior.
As such, the basic units of behavior which interest ethologists are what
they call &dquo;fixed action patterns.&dquo; These are complex behaviors, or series
of behaviors, which appear to be innately &dquo;programmed&dquo;; that is, they are
rigid, stereotyped, goal-oriented series of behaviors which are run off in an
inflexible order. Evidence for innateness comes from the fact that such
behaviors are produced even by animals reared in isolation from their
conspecifics, upon the first opportunity to do so (i.e., being presented
with the object or situation in question). For example, when first
presented with a nut in a laboratory situation, young squirrels reared in
isolation run off a sequence of nut-burying behaviors, including trying to
cover the nut with nonexistent dirt and tamping it down-apparently
oblivious to the fact that, at the end, the nut still sits uncovered on the
laboratory table (Brown, 1965).
In order to facilitate the discussion of Lorenz’ theory of aggression, it
may be helpful to present an oversimplified version of a model of behavior
used by ethologists. Behavior is often thought of as having both an
external and an internal determinant. The external one is the &dquo;sign
stimulus&dquo; or &dquo;releaser&dquo;-that is, a particular feature of the environment
that consistently elicits a fixed action pattern. The internal determinant,
and one crucial to Lorenz’ concept of the &dquo;spontaneous&dquo; nature of
aggression, is described by Brown (1965: 29):
[The] internal determinant is a state of drive or a charge of energy specific to
the fixed action pattern and indeed produced by the mechanism of that
pattern. It was Lorenz ... who first proposed the notion of ’action-specific
energy.’ It is not at all clear how to translate these ’energies’ into serious
neurophysiology and some ethologists (Hinde, 1959) prefer the term ’specific
action potential.’ The idea is that there must be distinct forces pressing for the
performance of distinct reaction patterns. Some of these forces may be rather
continuously generated and some are probably seasonal. These forces intensify
[294]
with time and their strength determmes the ease of firing the action pattern.
Performance of the action reduces the strength of the internal force.
In addition to these two determinants, ethologists posit two internal
mediating mechanisms: (a) &dquo;specific inhibitory blocks&dquo; which normally
prevent discharge of action-specific energy and therefore the behavior in
question; and (b) &dquo;releasing mechanisms&dquo; which remove the inhibitory
blocks when activated by a releaser stimulus, thereby releasing blocked
energy and producing the behavior (Brown, 1965: 29). The releaser
mechanisms may be either wholly innate (genetically transmitted) or
partly learned (Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Wickler, 1968).
According to Tinbergen (1968), there are four questions that are
central to ethological investigation.
(a) Survival value: &dquo;In what ways does this phenomenon (behavior) influence the
survival, the success of the animal?&dquo;
(b) Immediate instance causation: &dquo;What makes behavior happen at any given
moment? How does its ’machinery’ [i.e., its biology] work?&dquo;
(c) Developmental causation: &dquo;How does the behavior machinery develop as the
individual grows up?&dquo;
(d) Evolutionary causation: &dquo;How have the behavior systems of each species
evolved until they became what they are now?&dquo; (Tmbergen, 1968: 1412).
Despite Tinbergen’s (1968) insistence that it is ethology’s methods
rather than its other-species results that should be applied to humans,
many ethologists continue to be interested in cross-species generalizations,
especially as they may apply to humans. While the &dquo;principle of
independent evolution of behaviors&dquo; would seem to preclude cross-species
generalizations, two principles which flow from evolution have &dquo;saved&dquo;
this possibility. (a) Phylogenetic relatedness: &dquo;Behavioral homologies [i.e.,
&dquo;truly similar because of common ancestry&dquo;] increase in frequency and
detail among different animal species as proximity to a common ancestral
species increases&dquo; (Lockard, 1971: 172). This is the basis for the
comparative method. (b) Ecological convergence: &dquo;Similar behaviors
among unrelated forms result from similar selection pressures&dquo; (1971:
172). This is the basis for the ecological method.
Aggression from the ethological viewpoint. Ethologists, like the
individuals in any other discipline, are not of a single mind on the subject
of aggression. However, if there is anyone among them who has come to
be associated with this topic, it is Konrad Lorenz. His theory of aggression
(Lorenz, 1966) deserves coverage here not because it is representative of
the field-it is not (although when given the opportunity in print, several
prominent ethologists have declined to offer substantive criticism)-but for
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a number of other reasons. He is considered one of the founders of
ethology-if not the founder-and is thought by many nonethologists to be
its spokesman. Further, his account is probably the most extreme offered
by a responsible scientist and is certainly the best known. For these
reasons, it is the one which anyone writing in the area of aggression has to
deal with sooner or later.
Very simply, Lorenz believes that aggression in human beings stems
from an &dquo;instinct for aggression&dquo; that humans share with most other
species. Strictly speaking this is intraspecies aggression which has evolved
because of its alleged survival value for most species. Contrary to what one
might expect, intraspecies aggression is not dangerous or maladaptive for
the species, at least among nonhumans, because together with this
aggressive instinct have evolved &dquo;instinctive&dquo; inhibitory mechanisms
including the ritualization of aggression (enabling the receiver to instinc-
tively recognize the aggressor’s behavior as being different from a real
mortal attack) and gestures of appeasement or submission which cause the
aggressor to instinctively terminate the attack.
Lorenz accounts for the impressive degree of aggression among humans
by suggesting that they have no such instinctive inhibitions to aggression.
This is so, he says, because early in man’s evolution, such inhibitions were
not necessary. Man’s physiology contained no terribly dangerous weapons
on the order of the wolf’s teeth and jaws or the lion’s claws, with which to
kill his conspecifics with dispatch; consequently, no (or only weak)
compensating inhibitory mechanisms were evolved. However, according to
Lorenz, the invention of &dquo;artificial weapons&dquo; upset the natural balance
between instinctual aggression and killing potential on the one hand, and
the weak inhibitions against aggression on the other. Over time, things got
out of hand because of the weapons’ increasing effectiveness for killing as
against the still-feeble innate inhibitions against killing. In more modern
days, this imbalance has been further exacerbated by the lack of
immediacy or direct experience with the victim’s suffering, a condition
afforded by increasingly effective long-range weapons.
One of Lorenz’ fundamental assumptions is that &dquo;human behavior is
fueled and motivated, directly and indirectly, by ’spontaneous’ instincts
physiologically identical with those of animals lower on the evolutionary
scale&dquo; (Willhoite, 1971: 621). The reader may now more fully appreciate
the earlier discussion of &dquo;action-specific energy,&dquo; for Lorenz sees the
aggressive instinct as subject to these principles. Energy specific for the
performance of aggression accumulates in the central nervous system,
generating pressure for its release by appropriate stimuli. If the appropriate
stimuli are not present, the organism may seek them out for release, a
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process called &dquo;appetitive behavior&dquo; (Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Wickler, 1968).
Or if none are found and energy accumulates beyond a certain point, the
behavior may &dquo;explode&dquo; in the absence of any relevant external stimuli.
However, once sufficient behavior has been enacted to exhaust the
previously accumulated energy, normal releasing stimuli are ineffective in
getting the organism to respond until sufficient energy can accumulate
again in the &dquo;instinct center.&dquo;
Lorenz also conceives of the aggressive instinct as a general, unitary
drive capable of powering a wide range of other behaviors as well. He
speculates that social, affectional bonds may be derived from diverted
aggressive energy, and that smiles of greeting may be a result of ritualized,
redirected aggression.
Because Lorenz conceives of aggression as an &dquo;ineradicable instinct,&dquo; his
prescriptions for dealing with it understandably concern ways of rechan-
neling it rather than trying to eliminate it entirely. Because he feels that
the society makes impossible demands upon the individual for suppressing
his &dquo;natural&dquo; instincts, what humans need is &dquo;ritualized&dquo; release: their
aggression needs to be redirected into socially beneficial or at least
harmless channels such as space ventures or international sports.
Criticisms of Lorenz’ theory. Lorenz’ theory of aggression, of course,
has been highly controversial and has prompted a number of serious
criticisms varying widely in quality. Leaving aside for the moment such
ascientific questions as the societal effects of Lorenz’ view of human
nature, he has been severly attacked for the inadequacy of both his data
and his logic. I can only begin here to sketch out some of the more telling
counterarguments in their briefest form, and the reader is urged to consult
the cited sources for more detail. There are two critical questions in
evaluating Lorenz’ theory. First, how valid is his theory for animal (i.e.,
nonhuman) behavior? How accurate, complete, and generalizable is it?
And second, how well does the theory apply to human behavior? These
questions will be considered in this order, with an intervening section
dealing with cross-species comparisons in the theory.
(1) Applicability to animals: Aside from near-hysterical outbursts from
literati, Lorenz’ most severe critics have been his fellow professionals
working in animal behavior and related fields. It is interesting that many
reviewers who do not specialize in any such related fields have been willing
to assume the validity of Lorenz’ animal evidence but feel he has erred in
applying these results to humans, whereas many specialists in these areas
feel that his conclusions about animals are fundamentally wrong. Barnett
(1973: 76) goes so far as to say that Lorenz’ book &dquo;does not in fact
represent the methods or opinions current in ethology.&dquo; Scott (1973),
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Crook (1973a), Gorer (1973), and Berkowitz (1969) all charge in one
form or another that Lorenz’ notions are outdated, that he has ignored the
bulk of experimental literature in the field, and that his expertise is limited
to only a few species of animals.
Some writers have charged that the data from which Lorenz generalizes
and with which he is intimately familiar are either artifacts of the setting
or specific only to a few selected species. Carrighar (1973) alleges that
Lorenz’ use of &dquo;tamed&dquo; animals in captivity (e.g., geese and fish) has
resulted in abnormally heightened aggressiveness. Meyer-Holzapfel (1968),
Pilbeam (1973), and Zuckerman (1932) all provide evidence that captivity
may in fact enhance social conflict and aggression. Also, irrespective of
captivity, crowding may have had the same effect (Schneirla, 1973;
Carrighar, 1973). Also, Carrighar (1973) suggests that Lorenz has used
only animals who demand &dquo;individual distance&dquo; (e.g., birds and fish) and
dislike close association with their conspecifics. By contrast, mammals-to
which humans belong-are 
&dquo; ’contact’ species-that is, they seek and enjoy
the touch of their own kind&dquo; (Carrighar, 1973: 129). However, there is
some inconsistency on this point, for Crook (1973a) states that there are
&dquo;contact&dquo; and &dquo;distance&dquo; species among both birds and mammals. Lorenz
also shows weakness in his knowledge of primates, in one place referring to
them as &dquo;irascible,&dquo; whereas the consensus generally is that, except for the
usual kinds of ritualized &dquo;aggression&dquo; (Washburn, in de Reuck and Knight,
1966), primates and especially man’s nearest relatives, the anthropoid
apes, are quite &dquo;amiable&dquo; (Montagu, 1973b) in their natural environment.
Lorenz’ assumption that aggression is a general, unitary drive has come
under attack from several writers, including Berkowitz (1969), who cites
Moyer’s work (summarized in Moyer, 1971) which suggests that &dquo;there are
several kinds of aggression, each of which has a particular neural and
endocrine basis&dquo; (Berkowitz, 1969: 381). Further, Lorenz’ assertion that
social, affective bonds are derived from the aggressive instinct is
contradicted by Harlow’s famous monkey studies, which showed that
affection developed first, followed by fear, and then aggression.
A number of writers have found fault with Lorenz’ notion of the
&dquo;spontaneous&dquo; nature of aggression. Berkowitz (1969) cites two noncon-
firming sources: Hinde’s suggestions that stimulus satiation may account
for reduced elicitability of response rather than an &dquo;exhaustion&dquo; of
&dquo;action-specific energy;&dquo; and explanations by Hinde and Ziegler separately
&dquo;that many apparent demonstrations of internally-driven spontaneity can
be traced to external stimuli and the operation of associative factors&dquo;
(Berkowitz, 1969: 380). Other writers have questioned whether the
spontaneous discharge of aggressive energy, which would unnecessarily
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thrust the organism into danger, could have evolved at all, being contrary
to natural selection (Bartlett and Bartlett, 1971; Scott, 1973). Summariz-
ing his critique of Lorenz’ notions of spontaneity, Crook (1973a: 193)
states: &dquo;In any case, the whole structure of motivation theory in ethology
has undergone a major conceptual revision in recent years and even if
aggression could be classified descriptively as an ’appetite,’ the simple
Lorenz-Ardrey account of its causation would have to be severly
modernized.&dquo;
Often forgotten in the attention to aggression is the fact that animals
have a second major, and probably more frequently used, response to
threat, namely flight (Tinbergen, 1968; Fromm, 1973). For most species
under such conditions, fighting is only a last resort when flight is not
possible. Fromm (1973: 36) comments on Lorenz’ downplaying of this
response:
In no manner is aggression more ’natural’ than flight. Why, then, do
instinctivists talk exclusively about the intensity of the innate impulses of
aggression, rather than to speak with the same emphasis about the innate
impulse for flight? ... A theory centered around man’s ’uncontrollable flight
instinct’ may sound funny, but it is neurophysiologically as sound as that of
’uncontrollable aggression.’ In fact, from a biological standpoint it would seem
that flight serves self-preservation better than fight.... The speculations
[omitted here] are only intended to point to the ethological bias in favor of
the concept of homo aggressivus.
Barnett (1973) criticizes Lorenz for confusing heredity and develop-
ment and for failing to take account of how behavior develops throughout
the organism’s life. It is mistaken to assume that mere uniformity of
behavior within a species is evidence of innate factors. Hunt (1973)
describes cases in which some ethologists, formerly committed to
traditional notions of &dquo;flxed action patterns,&dquo; upon closer examination
discovered that some of these behavior sequences were actually molded to
a great extent by particular environmental opportunities and learning
experiences.
And finally, Scott (1973) claims that Lorenz simply leaves out the
other major causes of aggression, such as differential heredity, training,
and social disorganization.
(2) Lorenz’ cross-species comparisons: Under any circumstances, it is
risky to make cross-species generalizations of physiological commonalities
assumed to underlie behaviors that appear similar. Lehrman (1953) states
that &dquo;it is not very judicious, and actually is rash ... to assume that the
mechanisms underlying two similar response characteristics are in any way
identical, homologous, or even similar&dquo; (quoted in Berkowitz, 1969: 376),
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simply on the basis of apparent similarity of behaviors across species-
similarity which, Berkowitz adds, may be only in the eye of the beholder.
However, Lorenz is particularly loose in making such assumptions. As
Alland (1969: 553) puts it, &dquo;Lorenz has a tendency to describe animal
behavior anthropomorphically, and to reverse his field and attribute
animal-like responses to man when it suits his arguments.&dquo; Both Eisenberg
(1972) and Berkowitz (1969) accuse Lorenz of acting as if he has
&dquo;explained&dquo; such behaviors simply by attaching the same labels to them,
thereby &dquo;misrepresenting analogy as homology&dquo; (Eisenberg, 1972: 125).
(3) Applicability to humans: Erich Fromm (1973: 35) distinguishes
two quite different kinds of aggression among humans: benign and
malignant.
The first, which man shares with all animals, is a phylogenetically programed
impulse to attack (or to flee) when vital interests are threatened. This
defensive, benign aggression is in the service of the survival of the individual
and the species; it is biologically adaptive and ceases when the threat has
ceased to exist. The other type, malignant aggression, i.e., destructiveness and
cruelty, is specific for the human species and is virtually absent in most
mammals; it is not phylogenetically programed and not biologically adaptive.
Only the second type of aggression, says Fromm, is &dquo;evil,&dquo; and it is not
instinctive at all but rather distinctly human and part of man’s own doing.
Fromm’s distinction is a good one, but in real life it is hard to preserve in
such clear-cut form.
One of the most striking characteristics of human beings is their
impressive diversity of culture. Practices may vary enormously from
culture to culture. The same behavior may be praised or taken for granted
in one culture and may be pilloried and condemned in another. Eisenberg
(1972: 126) describes the difficulties that such diversity poses for the
theory of instinctive aggression:
If we explain the murderous raids of Brazilian Indians on the basis of an innate
aggressive instinct, we shall have to invent an involved theory of repression,
reaction formation, and sublimation to account for the peacefulness of the
Eskimo. Would it not be far more parsimonious to begin with the assumption
that men are by nature neither aggressive nor peaceful, but rather are
fashioned into one or another as the result of a complex interaction between a
widely, but not infinitely, modifiable set of biological givens and the shaping
influences of the biological environment, the cultural envelope, and individual
experience?
Lorenz’ suggestions for dealing with aggressiveness in humans have also
come under attack. Drawing on his own extensive experimental research,
Berkowitz (1969) concludes that aggression excites rather than deflates
aggressive urges. This point is supported by Moyer (1973), who cites
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soccer riots in several countries as well as research by Goldstein and Arms
(1971), who found much greater hostility and irritability in fans who had
watched a football game than among fans who had attended a gymnastics
match. There is enough research to conclude, says Berkowitz, that
aggression is likely to lead to even more, not less, aggression. And even
Desmond Morris (1968) disagrees with Lorenz, preferring &dquo;massive
de-population&dquo; to &dquo;boisterous international football&dquo; as the key to
lowering the level of human aggression (quoted in Berkowitz, 1969).
In addition to these rather specific criticisms, it should be noted that
Lorenz’ theory ignores the role of three major classes of determinants of
aggression in humans: learning, structural causes, and &dquo;semi-autonomous&dquo;
psychological causes. (a) Learning: Learning may modify, subordinate, or
replace physiologically determined aggressive impulses. Learning mediates
the acquisition of aggressive behavior in many different ways. Aggressive
behavior is learned by observation of others (Bandura, 1973) or by direct
experience. Children learn that aggression is often highly instrumental,
useful, effective behavior and that it is often reinforced. They also learn
that the successful use of aggression often is a function of one’s power
over others. They are surrounded with examples of aggression and may
become desensitized to media displays of it (Cline et al., 1973). Eisenberg
(1972: 127) summarizes the point well:
The very ubiquity of violence in Western society, however we explam its
genesis historically, guarantees that children are surfeited with opportunities
to learn violent behavior. The child sees that violence pays off; he is provided
with adult models of violent behavior with whom to identify (television pales
beside real life). Violence as an appropriate response to the resolution of
intergroup conflict is sanctioned by national leaders.... When violence is
sanctioned, it will increase. It can be expected to generalize to situations not
’intended’ to come within official pardon. Learning may not account
completely for human aggression, but the social forces in contemporary
society that encourage its development are so evident that preoccupation with
hypothesized biological factors is almost quixotic.
However, most prolearning writers do not discuss the very real possibility
that humans may be biologically predisposed to easily learn aggressiveness,
through specific mechanisms discussed later.
(b) Structural causes: Also ignored by Lorenz are the many structural
forces which promote conflict and aggression in humans. Scott (1969) and
Fromm (1973) suggest that just as social disorganization in animal
societies leads to greater overt aggression, its analogues in human
societies-poor international organization, and normlessness and lack of
community-also predispose humans toward aggression and violence.
Further, a great deal of human conflict stems from the fact that human
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groups often have incompatible goals and are engaged in competition over
scarce resources. Such conflicts and much behavior in them are &dquo;realistic&dquo;
(Campbell, 1965; Levine and Campbell, 1972), rather than instinctual in
origin. If the vast number of Prisoner’s Dilemma studies which have filled
this journal’s pages have shown anything at all, it is that, in a wide range of
situations characterized by particular strategic or motivational patterns,
what appears to be &dquo;hostile,&dquo; &dquo;destructive,&dquo; or &dquo;selfish&dquo; behavior is not at
all the result of &dquo;innate aggression&dquo; or the characteristics of the actors, but
instead are conventionally (i.e., individualistically) rational decisions in the
context of a very difficult situation. Such problems are structural, not
biological in nature. And finally, the Bartletts (1971) argue that Lorenzian
notions of aggression-especially when misused as by Ardrey (1966,
1961)-both ignore and detract attention from exploitation:
This ’science’ precludes criticism of social structures and thwarts genuine
inquiry into the human practice of exploitation. The convulsive current thrust
of the exploiting classes to keep in their grasp the earth and its people is
accepted by these authors as the action of the instincts. The question: Who
gains by the power to exploit? is put outside the realm of science [Bartlett and
Bartlett, 1971: 218].
Similarly, blaming &dquo;technology&dquo; for the human abuses of technology and
of other humans masks questions of what groups of people have created it,
own it, and use it, and for what purposes.
(c) Psychological factors: The proponents of biological explanations of
human conflict fail to appreciate adequately the role that symbolic issues
often play in causing conflict or even aggression. (The most immediate
example is the very controversy under review here, which is at least in part
a conflict over an &dquo;image of man.&dquo;) Whereas animals’ aggressive drives lead
them to attack only actual enemies who present an actual threat,
&dquo;man... by virtue of his ability to manipulate symbols, attaches the label
’enemy’ to entire categories of things: other animals, other people-even
inanimate objects and ideas. Accordingly aggression ceases to be ruled by
the situation&dquo; (Rapoport, 1965: 118)-or, one might add, by one’s
physiology. Fromm (1973) and Erikson (1968) even suggest that it may
not be accurate to refer to some human aggression as intraspecific, since
the victims of much violence are not even thought of as fellow humans.
Another psychological dimension thought to lead to human aggression-
although it may have immediate social-structural roots-is the feeling of
powerlessness or helplessness. More specifically, in several well-
documented cases of urban disorders, the operative factor was found to be
a combination of the lack of political efficacy together with a high sense
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of personal efficacy (Caplan, 1971; for a more comprehensive treatment of
structural and psychological inputs to conflict, see Nelson, 1971).
Thus far under the heading of ethology, I have considered only Lorenz’
theory of aggression. Aggression is also dealt with indirectly in a number
of other ethological topics, and some coverage of a few of them is
appropriate here.
Dominance hierarchies. The central question here concerns the relative
role that aggression, either overt or ritualized, plays vis-a-vis other possible
determinants of the dominance hierarchy. Aggressiveness is a factor in
dominance hierarchies in at least two different ways. As we have seen, in
either overt or ritualized form it may serve as a means of deciding
positions within the order. However, the level of aggression is also
controlled by the dominance hierarchy-the hierarchy has the function
(but not the &dquo;purpose,&dquo; as some authors carelessly imply)3 of containing
and channeling aggressiveness. I am concerned only with the former
relation here.
Earlier we saw that aggression, in either overt or ritualized form (a
distinction which varies with species), may play a central role in
establishing position in a dominance hierarchy in certain species, partic-
ularly those discussed by Scott (1969) and Gottier (1972). However, in
certain other species, aggression in any form may be relatively unrelated to
position and dominance. Reviewing recent work on primates, Pilbeam
(1973: 116) says, &dquo;What is particularly interesting in the newer animal
studies is the extent to which aggression, priority of access, and leadership
are divorced from each other.&dquo; Klopfer (1969) also notes that in some
herd animals (e.g., ungulates) aggressiveness appears unrelated to leader-
ship in matters of when and where the herd moves, and that this may be a
matter of greater responsiveness to the environment and reduced depend-
ence upon peers. Gottier (1972) reviews studies of chickens in which
morphological modifications of structures functional for aggression (e.g.,
removal of the bird’s beak) had little effect upon position in the hierarchy,
whereas modifications of more symbolic than functional significance (e.g.,
removal of the comb and wattle) had a much greater effect. And finally,
Mazur (1973: 514) notes that the determinants of status orders among
humans typically include neither overt aggression nor &dquo;overt gestures of
3. "In order to contain male aggressiveness and subordinate it to the needs of the
group, males tend to form fairly stable dominance-submission hierarchies" (Corning,
1971: 342). This statement is altogether too anthropomorphically purposive for
meaningful discourse, for it implies intention or design on the part of the male
animals in question. Most writers, including Corning, warn against just such practice.
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threat or submission,&dquo; although his data suggest biological bases of some
unspecified kind.
Furthermore, it is clear that a number of nonbiological factors also have
important influences upon dominance hierarchies and position within
them. Gottier (1972: 211) emphasizes the role of learning via a process of
distinguishing &dquo;cues relevant to winning&dquo; from &dquo;cues relevant to submit-
ting&dquo; through discrimination learning. In explaining the process by which a
young macaque’s position in the hierarchy is largely determined by its
mother’s relative rank, Lancaster (1973: 34) concludes: &dquo;From these
experiences, a young monkey learns both general social attitudes and the
specific treatment due others in the group.&dquo; Crook (1973a: 212) also
emphasizes the often overlooked importance of &dquo;social learning in the
structuring of groups.&dquo; In a passage reminiscent of Bandura’s studies of
modeling, Crook states: &dquo;Hall... has stressed the importance of observa-
tional learning in monkey groups; the experience of one animal is
witnessed by others and the information obtained utilised by them on
later occasions&dquo; (Crook, 1973a: 212). Washburn (1972: 34) notes that
even the style of dominance in some primates may be affected by prior
experience-he contrasts a &dquo;very relaxed and friendly&dquo; leader monkey who
exerted authority only when necessary with another monkey &dquo;who had
occupied a very insecure position before he came into control of a group&dquo;
and who &dquo;continually asserted his dominance over the other animals.&dquo;
Finally, Pilbeam (1973) calls into question much of the literature
dealing with primate dominance hierarchies and aggression. Earlier studies
of baboon behavior, stressing rigid dominance hierarchies and their
relation to aggression, male supremacy, and female subservience are
misleading, Pilbeam suggests, because they were carried out not in the
animals’ natural habitats but in game parks. There, he speculates, they live
under greater than normal tension due to the increased presence of
predators, especially humans. He claims that recent studies in more natural
environments have demonstrated more fluid group composition, hardly
discernible dominance hierarchies, infrequent aggression, and periodic
leadership by females. &dquo;In undisturbed species in the wild, dominance
hierarchies are hard to discern, if they are present at all; yet workers still
persist in trying to find them&dquo; (Pilbeam, 1973: 115). Pilbeam suggests that
the data from the earlier studies are artifactual results of an unnatural
environment: &dquo;The high degree of aggression, the hierarchies, the rigid
sex-role differences, were in a sense abnormalities.&dquo; Experimental manipu-
lation of the same species’ environment has yielded corroborative findings,
according to Pilbeam: stress-inducing confinement results in &dquo;more
aggression, more fighting, and the emergence of marked dominance
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hierarchies.&dquo; He concludes: &dquo;If dominance can come and go with varying
intensities of certain environmental pressures, then it is clearly not
innately inevitable, even in baboons. Rigid dominance hierarchies, then,
seem to be largely artifacts of abnormal environments&dquo; (Pilbeam, 1973:
116).
Territoriality. While territoriality is a legitimate subject of study among
serious ethologists and is thought by some to apply to humans (Tinbergen,
1968), its best-known treatment is the highly unscientific book by Robert
Ardrey (1966). Once again, I must discuss the atypical theory in order to
correct a large number of popular misconceptions. Ardrey believes that
humans, like other animals, have an &dquo;instinct&dquo; of territorial aggression, by
which one defends territory with which one has identified against strangers
of one’s own species. Both the identification with the territory and
aggression defending it are thought to be instinctive. Ardrey’s dramatic
flair and propensity for fast and loose thinking at the human level make
even Lorenz uneasy (Lorenz, 1970). The following example from Ardrey
(1966: 213) may suffice:
The continuity of human evolution from the world of the animal to the world
of man ensures that a human group in possession of a territory will behave
according to the universal laws of the territorial principle. What we call
patriotism, in other words, is a calculable force which, released by a
predictable situation, will animate man in a manner no different from other
territorial species.
Territoriality, however, is not the simple &dquo;universal law&dquo; that Ardrey
would have us believe, even among nonhuman species. To begin with,
there are a great many species that do not demonstrate territoriality at all.
Montagu (1973b) cites Bour1i8re (1954) to the effect that territoriality is
nowhere near as important in mammals as it is in birds, where the study
originated. Second, rather than causing aggression, territoriality may
actually have the effect of reducing agonistic behavior (Gottier, 1972) by
spacing the animals in such a way as to provide adequate food, breeding
opportunities, nesting space, and so forth. In so doing, territoriality also
serves as a mechanism for regulating population within a given area
(Wynne-Edwards, 1962). For more thorough discussion of the inade-
quacies of Ardrey’s speculations for animal behavior, the reader is urged to
see Crook (1973a), Klopfer (1973), Gorer (1973), and Holloway (1973).
Furthermore, it is doubtful that territoriality-at least as Ardrey
conceives of it-applies to humans. The carelessness of his multilevel
analogizing is revealed in the fact that group-level &dquo;territoriality&dquo; is
inconsistent with &dquo;instinctual&dquo; individual-level territoriality (Campbell,
1972: 24):
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Even though efforts to mobilize human ethnocentrism often make reference
to protecting home and family, group-level territoriality has always required
that the soldier abandon for extensive periods the protecting of his own wife,
children, and home. Individual territoriality and aggression means intra-group
conflict, and is regularly suppressed in the service of inter-group conflict.
In addition, there is enormous variation among cultures in the importance
of territoriality and private property. In those cultures where concern for
territory and private property is greatest, it is more likely that they have
their basis in their instrumental or even symbolic importance than in any
biological urges. This is illustrated most vividly by two observations made
by Bartlett and Bartlett (1971: 216-217). &dquo;First, what is owned often does
not lie within the territory or the nation of the owners. [It] is often a
piece of someone else’s ‘territory.’ &dquo; Second, the largest holders of
property (e.g., multinational corporations) are increasingly &dquo;extraterrito-
rial.&dquo; It is far more likely that the great concern for territory and property
among humans, at least in Western cultures, is predominantly an acquired
value, although there is no conclusive evidence that some form of
territoriality might not have a biological basis in humans (Scott, 1973).
&dquo;Crowding&dquo; and aggression. Another popular belief is that crowding has
the effect of increasing the level of aggression, both in human and
nonhuman species. Freedman et al. (1972: 529-530) have concisely
summarized the basic findings:
A large number of studies on nonhumans... have found that under a very
high population density normal social behavior tends to break down and a
sharp drop in the population occurs. A similar phenomenon has been observed
in natural settings... and has been noted in a wide variety of animals. On the
basis of these observations, several authors, notably Calhoun and Lorenz, have
concluded that high population density always leads to an increase in
aggressiveness and that this also occurs in humans.... But ... even the animal
research has not always produced consistent evidence for this proposition.
Among humans, both correlational and experimental studies have pro-
duced inconsistent results. Freedman and his colleagues have conducted
experiments showing generally negative results, but such results may be
largely artifactual and specific to features of the experiments. Some areas
of the world (e.g., Hong Kong, Holland) are prima facie evidence that
density alone does not lead to greater aggression. It is routinely pointed
out that there may be no necessary one-to-one relationship between
population density (the objective description of a physical condition) and
the subjective experience of not having enough space. Fromm (1973: 37)
believes that it is not population density as such but the &dquo;lack of social
structure, genuine common bonds and interest in life&dquo; that causes
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increased human aggression, but he does not mention the possibility that
an increase in sheer numbers may facilitate the disintegration of social
structure and common bonds. Fromm mentions a second closely related
condition which may increase the level of human aggressiveness: an
imbalance between the size of a population and the economic base for
supporting that population. Fromm (1973: 38) concludes:
It follows from these considerations that all analogies from animal to human
crowding are of little value. The animal has an instinctive ’knowledge’ of the
space and the social organization it needs. It reacts instinctively with
aggression in order to remedy a disturbance of its space and social structure. It
has no other way to respond to threats to its vital interests in these respects.
But man has many other ways. He can change the social structure, he can
develop bonds of solidarity and of common values beyond what is
instinctively given. The animal’s solution to crowding is a biological instinctive
one; man’s solution is social and political.
Fromm does not comment on whether humans might not also have
&dquo;instinctive knowledge&dquo; of how much space or the degree and kind of
social organization they need.
Closely related to &dquo;crowding&dquo; and perhaps territoriality as well is the
study of &dquo;personal space,&dquo; which has been receiving extensive but not
uniformly rigorous investigation (Evans and Howard, 1973). The concept
is well established in ethology and denotes &dquo;the physical space surrounding
an individual within which approach by another animal (generally a
conspecific) will elicit aggressive or defensive behavior&dquo; (Barash, 1973:
68), uneasiness, or retreat. Personal space is thought to have a biological
basis even in humans, but it is mediated by psychological factors, such as
expectations of the per capita space available (Barash, 1973). It has been
found to vary cross-culturally, between subcultures, by sex, and over time
by a developmental sequence. It is also studied under the rubric of
&dquo;proxemic behavior.&dquo; 
’
Biologically based sex differences in humans. There is general acknowl-
edgement that, despite a great deal of overlap in the distributions of the
two sexes in terms of aggression, there are innate biological differences
between them in &dquo;aggressiveness&dquo; in the more general sense (Brown, 1965;
Bardwick, 1971), although Bardwick notes the ambiguity and indeter-
minacy of such terms as &dquo;aggressive,&dquo; &dquo;active,&dquo; and &dquo;passive.&dquo; Here again,
however, cultural beliefs and practices interact strongly with biological
predispositions, so that disentangling the two sets of factors in order to
assess their relative contributions may be next to impossible (see Crook,
1973b, for an excellent summary of these points).
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It is difficult to discuss sex differences in aggressiveness without
commenting on the embarrassingly sexist tone that creeps into somebiologically oriented discussions of sex differences in general4 The
Bartletts’ (1971: 211) comment on the recent popularized books applies
as well to much other work: &dquo;The role of the female, not only in human
culture, but among other animals, has been glossed over and falsified.&dquo;
Nowhere is the sexist attitude more conscious and explicit than in Tiger
(1969), whose theory of biological sex differences justifies males monop-
olizing leadership positions in human culture on the basis of alleged
superiority of &dquo;male bonding&dquo; compared to the alleged inability of females
to form such &dquo;bonds.&dquo; According to Tiger, society looks to the male for
stability and leadership and to the female for child care, this division of
labor having a biological, evolutionary basis. At one point Tiger (1969: 60)
refers to &dquo;male bonding&dquo; as &dquo;the spinal column of a community.&dquo;
Much of Tiger’s evidence is taken from primate studies, so it is
appropriate to mention that recent primate studies tend to undermine his
thesis. Recall Pilbeam’s (1973) account of the recent studies, conducted in
more natural settings, showing less rigid sexual division of labor, with
females sharing leadership tasks. Lancaster (1973) also cites recent studies
showing that, among many primates, it is the older females who ensure the
stability of the group. Furthermore, because the males may often become
adventuresome wanderers and leave the troop (which we might call &dquo;male
dis-banding&dquo;), adult females assume a large share of group leadership, due
to &dquo;the stability of their social relations, their attachment to their home
ranges, and their knowledge about the resources of their environment&dquo;
(1973: 36). Criticizing the &dquo;male-centered bias&dquo; in earlier studies,
Lancaster regards Tiger’s alleged &dquo;psychobiological&dquo; differences regarding
a sexual division of labor as unnecessary. Some division of labor was
necessary, because of the lengthy dependence of human children.
However,
There is no need to say that evolution has brought about major psychological
differences between males and females to explain role differences. The only
difference we need to establish is that females lactate and males do not-all the
rest will follow through quite simple and obvious processes of social dynamics
reinforced by socialization [Lancaster, 1973: 99] .
Kurt6n (1972: viii) also believes that sex differences have been over-
emphasized in the study of early humans: &dquo;There is reason to suspect that
4. The reader will hopefully appreciate the difficulty of trying to distinguish
humans from other species without using the word "man" to refer to the human
species. I have tried to avoid such use generally but have occasionally deviated in
order to avoid inordinately clumsy exposition.
[308]
there was no absolute division between foraging-hunting-fighting males, on
the one hand, and stay-at-home, baby-sitting females, on the other.&dquo; For a
particularly penetrating review of Tiger’s thesis, the reader should consult
Fried (1969). In the rest of the biologically oriented literature, the reader
should be alert for the frequent tendency to uncritically interpret data in
ways consistent with long-standing cultural stereotypes. Like many
stereotypes, these may have some basis in fact, but they are prone to
exaggeration and selective interpretation.
The validity of the innate-acquired distinction. The distinction between
&dquo;innate&dquo; and &dquo;acquired&dquo; is far more complex and hazy than it might
appear at first. I will try to outline some of those complexities and discuss
some of the more carefully delineated relationships that are being
investigated.
At one extreme is the concept of instinct. Once common in the early
days of social science, the concept was discredited by early behaviorists in
psychology and fell into disrepute among social scientists generally.
However, instinct regained a cautious respectability within ethology and has
been reintroduced to the behavioral science parlance, although its status
has been diminished somewhat by Lorenz’ (1966) and Ardrey’s (1966,
1961) grossly imprecise use. However, the use of the concept of instinct
still encounters hostile resistance in many quarters. Montagu (1973b)
concedes that animals may have instincts, but insists dogmatically that
humans have none. And prior to his conversion to the &dquo;instinctivist&dquo;
position, Bolles (1967: 106) made a statement which still commands much
support but which he probably now regrets: &dquo;We may begin to wonder
whether instincts (or drives) are invoked only when not enough is known
about some behavior to explain it structurally.&dquo;
In spite of now-obligatory but still grudging admissions on both sides
that innate and environmental factors &dquo;interact&dquo; in vague, undefined ways
to produce much of behavior, there is still a great deal of all-or-none
thinking when it comes to the innate-acquired distinction. Here is an
example from a supposedly definitive recent description of ethology:
The appearance of a particular fixed action pattern in animals isolated from
their own species is clear evidence of genetic fixity. It is a constant
characteristic of the species concerned and is based upon a specific central
nervous mechanism that is inherited just as are morphological and physiolog-
ical characteristics [Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Wickler, 1968: 188].
This passage shows no awareness that many behaviors are shaped in ways
that do not involve &dquo;learning&dquo; but are the results of interactions (perhaps
even prenatal) between the growing organism and its species-specific
environment.
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More specifically, Schneirla rejects Lorenz’ dichotomizing of behavior
into innate and acquired or learned and insists that developmental
processes of behavior must be considered throughout the entire life cycle.
Tinbergen (1968: 1416) parts company with his old friend Lorenz on this
score.
I now agree (however belatedly) with Schneirla that we must extend our
interest to earlier stages of development and embark on a full program of
experimental embryology of behavior. When we do this, we discover that
interactions with the environment can indeed occur at early stages. These
interactions may concern small components of the total machinery of a fully
functional behavior pattern, and many of them cannot possibly be called
learning. But they are interactions with the environment, and must be taken
into account.... We simply have to do this if we want an answer to the
question to what extent the development of behavior can be influenced from
the outside.
But, Tinbergen continues, this recognition has further implications:
When we follow this procedure the rigid distinction between ’innate’ or
unmodifiable and ’acquired’ or modifiable behavior patterns becomes far less
sharp. This is owing to the discovery, on the one hand, that ’innate’ patterns
may contain elements that at an early stage developed in interaction with the
environment, and, on the other hand, that learning is, from step to step,
limited by internally imposed restrictions.
Seen in this light, Lorenz’ notion of &dquo;innate&dquo; is so &dquo;only in the sense of
’nonlearned,’ not in that of ’having grown without interaction in the
environment’ &dquo; (Tinbergen, 1968: 1416). Besides Schneirla and Tinbergen,
Lehrman (1962), Crook (1973b), and others have also concluded, by
somewhat similar reasoning, that heredity and learning cannot be
meaningfully distinguished; Verplanck (1955) arrives at the same conclu-
sion by a slightly different route.
Most recent writers on the subject agree that even apparently
&dquo;instinctual,&dquo; nonlearned behaviors are shaped by the organism’s environ-
ment to a degree not fully appreciated previously. Hunt (1973: 33) quotes
William Tavolga as saying: &dquo;At every level of organization from amoeba to
man, behavior develops out of the interaction between the cytoplasm and
the environment. You cannot go directly from the DNA molecule to a
specific piece of behavior, and there is no special or separate category of
behavior that can be called instinctive.&dquo;5
5. "No serious primatologist today accepts the notion of pre-programmed
primate instincts that emerge full blown. Biological tendencies mature and are
modified through interaction with the social-cultural environment" (Mazur, 1973:
527).
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The question in Verplanck’s (1955) title is apt: &dquo;Since learned behavior
is innate, and vice versa, what now?&dquo; If there is increasing consensus that
the old, easy distinctions are no longer meaningful and that most behavior
involves an &dquo;interaction&dquo; of some sort between biological and environmen-
tal forces, just how far does that take us? Not very far at all, unless we can
begin to specify the nature of those interactions. Some beginnings have
been made, and below I briefly mention five somewhat more specific areas
in which work is taking place.
(1) Interaction between biological factors and the physical or physiological
environment: This refers to the kinds of interactions discussed above,
whereby innate predispositions are shaped by the environment, in ways not
involving learning, into fully operative behavior patterns. No further
discussion is required here.
(2) The influence of biological factors upon learning: It is commonly observed
that one’s capacity for learning is to some extent genetically determined
(Verplanck, 1955; Alland, 1972; Emlen, 1967; Somit, 1968). It is perhaps
less well known that ethologists believe that biological factors may also
determine the directionality and types of learnmg which are easily acquired.
While Montagu believes that learning in humans is generalized and direction-
ally neutral, many ethologists insist that &dquo;there is bias built into the human
genotype, a bias toward learning more readily that which, in the evolutionary
history of the species, has tended to contribute most to individual and group
survival&dquo; (Willhoite, 1971: 624). Theoretically, such learning is guided by
internal &dquo;Sollwerte&dquo; or &dquo;templates for proper feedback&dquo; (Tinbergen, 1968:
1417), or as Lorenz calls them &dquo;mnate teaching mechanisms.&dquo; Washburn
(1972) is one of the mam proponents of the idea that humans are predisposed
by evolution to easily learn aggressiveness, thus skirting the issue of
&dquo;instinctive aggression.&dquo;
(3) Interaction between biological factors and learning: Here learning modifies,
or is added to, the biological component, such that the behavioral outcome is
different. In animals, &dquo;there are ... behavior patterns which do appear in the
inexperienced animal, but in an incomplete form, and which require
additional development through learning&dquo; (Tinbergen, 1968: 1416)-for
example, the calls of several bird species. In humans, Alland (1972: 151)
argues, while &dquo;genes are responsible for man’s capacity to acquire culture,&dquo;
the actual expression of culture requires experience and learning in the
environment.6 Tinbergen (1968) describes a complex interaction of biological
givens and learning in the environment, which characterizes childhood
intellectual development, whereby learning at various stages is guided by
different Sollwerte. If this is reminiscent of Piaget, it should be remembered
that Piaget’s original training was in zoology.
6. "But these distinctly human characteristics must not be taken as signs that we
have ’escaped nature’ or otherwise avoided our evolutionary history. On the contrary,
our cultural mode of adaptation, which is completely linked to our physiological
capacity for the acquisition of linguistic competence, is our species-specific
evolutionary heritage" (Bastian and Bermant, 1973: 357).
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(4) The influence of biological factors upon culture or social structure: Hall
(1968) and Emlen (1967) conceive of culture as an extension of basic
biological processes. Coming (1971: 340) also outlines several ways in which
&dquo;our biological needs impose [numerous imperatives] upon our social
organization.&dquo; Obviously such an approach can be prone to mis- or
overinterpretation and has met with criticism (Crook, 1973a, 1973b).
(5) Interaction between biological factors and culture: Here culture modifies
biological factors, such that the outcome is a product of the interaction of
the two. This is an oft-recurring theme, both for behavior in general (Corning,
1971; Willhoite, 1971; Alland, 1969) and for aggression in particular (Crook,
1973a; Dubos, 1973; Corning, 1971).
An assessment of ethology. An overall evaluation of ethology is
difficult because of the widely varying quality of its offerings. However, a
few rough generalizations can be made. On their original home ground,
animal behavior, ethologists generally possess an enormous wealth of
information and are biologically very sophisticated. However, many of
them-but by no means all-still appear to be prone to reach too readily
for purely biological interpretations of complex phenomena while under-
estimating the importance of experience with the environment. Lockard’s
(1971) claims to the contrary, comparative psychology is at least alive, if
not well, and continues to perform a valuable service as a check upon the
data, logic, and interpretations of ethology. Furthermore, despite their
criticism of laboratory experiments, ethologists in some cases have been
forced by methodological considerations to use more tightly controlled
experiments in what they call the &dquo;semi-wild.&dquo;
In the realm of human behavior, serious and careful ethological work
has been done (for example, Jones, 1972; Tinbergen, 1972), and the
approach appears to be gaining adherents. However, on the subject under
discussion in this review, aggression, ethologists tend to break into at least
two groups on the issue of whether aggression is an ineradicable part of
human nature. (I am ignoring for the time being the fact that definitional
differences may account for some of the discrepancies, as explained in the
introduction, and continue to use the more narrowly restricted definition
of aggression.) Some appear to hold an &dquo;image of man&dquo; (nonscientifically
derived, I think) as intrinsically malevolent and destructive, which they are
at great pains to uphold at all costs. (Lorenz does not fit entirely into this
camp.) Others apparently see aggression as only a specific example of the
more general belief that there are definite limits-genetically determined,
they believe-to human beings’ plasticity and malleability. Even within the
latter group, however, there are often overtones of gloom and despair (see,
for example, the remarkable final two paragraphs of Tinbergen, 1968; also
see Lorenz’ views, Newsweek, 1973).
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Unfortunately, the real substantive contributions of ethology in this
area have, if anything, been delayed or subverted by the generally inept
popularized accounts. Whatever the real motives of those writers may have
been, their books give the appearance of trying an end run on the scientific
community and (to mix metaphors badly) playing to the crowd (and in
the case of the repeaters and later arrivals on the best seller lists, simply
cashing in on a good thing). While their notions may have temporarily
become intellectually chic and made for exciting cocktail-party patter,
they were sitting ducks for serious scientists with more adequate data and
superior logic. As Crook (1973a: 216) puts it, &dquo;The promulgation of
one-sided and misleadingly simplified doctrine is of no assistance to those
concerned and could lead them to neglect those highly relevant contribu-
tions that modern ethological theory and experimental method can
legitimately supply.&dquo;
Finally, the general theoretical approach of ethology deserves com-
ment. First, a feature of many ethologists’ arguments which is both
obfuscatory and yet perhaps more appealing to nonscientists is their
proclivity to &dquo;explain knowns with unknowns.&dquo; Two prominent ethol-
ogists say about their field, &dquo;Pronouncements about inaccessible psychic
phenomena are avoided&dquo; (Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Wickler, 1968: 187). Yet,
many ethologists are not reluctant to make pronouncements about
inaccessible, equally mystical structures or mechanisms which are alleged
to exist (e.g., Lorenz’ &dquo;innate teaching mechanism&dquo;). This seems odd for a
discipline that takes great pride in hard-headed objectivity.
Second, if we are to take ethologists at their word-and often, their
deeds-many have opted for as artificially narrowly constricted a view of
behavior as social scientists have traditionally held by not considering
biological factors at all. The field is often defined as &dquo;the biology of
behavior,&dquo; or, even more extreme, in Lorenz’ words, &dquo;the study of innate
behavior; the study of species-specific drive activities&dquo; (Hunt, 1973: 29).
Similarly, Eibl-Eibesfeldt and Wickler (1968: 187) say: &dquo;The aim of
ethology is to explain both phylogenetically and physiologically the
functional relationships of all factors involved in behavior.&dquo; By defining
their field in this way, ethologists have ruled out the study of any causal
factors other than biological ones. Rather than seeking in an open-minded
fashion for all possible causes of phenomena, they instead have a particular
case to argue. They seek not so much to explain dependent variables as to
push the limits of a small set of particular independent variables. (The
sharp distinction between &dquo;innate&dquo; and &dquo;learned&dquo; was apparently drawn
by the ethologists themselves-see Berkowitz, 1969; Verplanck, 1955;
Crook, 1973b.) This process, in which one assumes at the outset that one’s
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hypothesis is not only valid but causally prepotent to any other type of
factor, may use scientific procedures for its research, and may be one way
in which the store of scientific knowledge as a whole advances. But it is
not the model held up as the ideal method for scientific discovery. And it
runs a greater risk of leading to errors of fact, of logic, and of utilization of
its ideas in the real world. This is, of course, not to say that other fields
have not followed the same course-for example, behaviorism and &dquo;overly
socialized&dquo; views of man (Wrong, 1963).
THE RELEVANCE OF ANIMAL BEHAVIOR FOR THE
STUDY OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Can we really learn anything valid about human behavior-in this case,
aggression and conflict-from the results of animal behavior? The growing
consensus, based upon increasingly sophisticated work in several fields, is a
carefully qualified no. I will attempt to summarize the major reasons for
this belief.
To paraphrase a principle used by Rae Carlson (1971), human beings
are like all other species (or more broadly, all living systems), like some
other species, and like no other species. The crucial question is which of
the three comparisons is most likely to account for most of important
human behavior. Humans share with other animals, especially their nearest
biological relatives, the primates, certain important behaviors and char-
acteristics : a social nature, small-group attachments, mother-infant bonds,
dominance relations (Washburn, 1972), and peer play (Rule, 1967). Hebb
(1971) notes that other animals also demonstrate &dquo;altruism,&dquo; and other
writers discuss the possession of a simple &dquo;protoculture&dquo; by several species
(Berry, 1973), characterized by a few of the many elements which
comprise human culture. However, humans also possess a large number of
key, unique characteristics: greater and more generalized cognitive-
intellectual capacity (Bermant, 1973); symbolic language with a generative
grammar; greater control over emotions, especially rage (Washburn, 1972);
greater skill in tool use; highly developed culture, as compared to the
&dquo;protoculture&dquo; of nonhumans; self-awareness; and, because of many of
the foregoing, lesser dependence on or vulnerability to any particular
environmental arrangement.
The points quoted earlier from Lockard (1971) also underline the error
of making easy translations of animal behavior results to human behavior.
To repeat briefly: (a) There is no phylogenetic scale among living species
(Hodos and Campbell, 1969). This means, for example, that, in extrapolat-
ing from primate behavior to humans, &dquo;we are really making two leaps in
the dark, one from the monkey back to man’s common ancestor, and
again from this ancestor to man&dquo; (Boulding, 1973: 170). And, as we have
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seen, any one such leap is fraught with difficulties. (b) The learning
abilities of humans are qualitatively, not merely quantitatively, different
from those of animals. Humans possess highly generalized (although
perhaps not always directionally neutral) learning abilities, while the
consensus among animal behaviorists is that animals possess &dquo;more-or-less
specific complement [s] of learning capabilities&dquo; (Bermant, 1973: 7). (c)
Different species are quite different from each other and can be compared
only under certain special conditions, by use of the comparative method
or the ecological method.
We can now see the relevance of animals in the comparative method and in the
ecological method; the animals that are behaviorally relevant are those related
to man by common ancestry, or those with similarities due to similar selection
pressures. Apes are relevant by relatedness, wolves for ecological reasons....
[However,] there are too few ape species, each too specialized, for easy use of
the comparative method; and too few ecologically analogous species for easy
use of the ecological method [Lockard, 1971: 177].
If all this is so, then what do we make of apparent similarities in
behavior in different species? Lockard (1971: 173-174) lists four
alternative interpretations for such alleged similarities:
(aJ Some truly homologous property, perhaps widespread [across species],
was demonstrated. (bJ Unknown ecological factors happened to produce
analogous properties in these two-and perhaps no more-[species] which have
superficial resemblances, but which differ in fundamental ways not explored.
(c) Coarse analyses often produce results that fail to discriminate between
things that are actually quite different. (dJ The general climate of opinion and
the eagerness to find similarities have led to casual interpretations and an easy
task of persuasion of a credulous audience. One currently has no way of
knowing which interpretation to give a study.
Bermant (1973) has examined four different types of potential
&dquo;discontinuities&dquo; between human and nonhuman species to see whether
claims of a discontinuity or qualitative difference are valid. These
dimensions include species separation, biologically historical discontinuity,
technical (or manipulative) discontinuity, and moral discontinuity. He
concludes:
In each of the four areas discussed ... the conclusion has been the same: there
is no good reason to suspect that data or theories based on the behavior of
nonhuman animals will give an adequate account of human conduct. Future
generations of behavioral scientists will, I suspect, view the opposite claim as
one of several curiosities coming out of a rather bizarre period in the history
of our discipline [Bermant, 1973: 14].
There is a growing scientifically based consensus that, in order to
understand human behavior adequately, both from biological and non-
biological viewpoints, we must study humans as humans, rather than
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relying upon results from animals, except under the special conditions
noted earlier (see especially Tinbergen, 1968; Scott, 1969; Lockard,
1971). In the remainder of this review, I will consider approaches which to
greater or lesser degrees adhere to this premise.
EVOLUTIONARY APPROACHES TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR
There was an Ape in the days that were earlier;
Centuries passed and his hair became curlier;
Centuries more gave a thumb to his wrist,-
Then he was a Man,-and a Positivist.
-Mortimer Collins
The British Birds
The separation of evolutionary approaches from the other areas
considered in this review is to some extent artificial. However, insofar as
scientists have employed evolutionary ideas to study human beings as such
rather than inferring their characteristics primarily from other species, the
approach warrants separate coverage. Earlier I stated that evolutionary
theory is the very heart of modem biology generally (encompassing a wide
range of previously unrelated specialties), and, more specifically, of the
biology of behavior. More recently, these ideas have been seriously applied
to new areas of human behavior. &dquo;This interest has opened an exciting
field for theory and research specifically because it operates without the
assumption that, since men are animals, they must behave like other
animals&dquo; (Alland,1972: 2).
The social sciences, except for anthropology, have largely ignored or
consciously avoided evolutionary theory, perhaps as much for social and
political as for purely intellectual reasons-namely, the exploitative abuses
to which bastardized versions of the theory were put in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. This calculated ignorance or avoidance is no
longer tenable, for the approach is finding increasing application in the
social sciences. (For a good introduction to such applications, see Corning,
1971, a piece which is occasionally brilliant but highly uneven, and Alland,
1969, an excellent and concise summary of &dquo;strong&dquo;-i.e., excessively
deterministic-and &dquo;weak&dquo; theories of biological causes of human behav-
ior.)
This is not to say, however, that evolutionary theory is infallible.
Macbeth (1971), for one, has done a fme and eminently readable job of
exposing all the warts on the face of at least classical Darwinian theory, as
well as many of the concepts retained in the &dquo;modern syntheses.&dquo; His
position is that, while there is no doubt that evolution-or something like
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it-has occurred, the theories purporting to explain the process are
manifestly inadequate, sometimes embarrassingly so in light of the often
grandiose claims made for them.
While the evolution of physical characteristics has long been accepted,
the evolution of behavior patterns has not yet won widespread support,
for there is no &dquo;fossil behavior&dquo; (Carrighar, 1973: 123). Lockard (1971)
provides a good short overview of the historical development of modern
biology up to the point of incorporating behavior into the theory. At that
point, he says,
Scientifically speaking, only two pieces of information were needed to brmg
behavior into the modern synthesis of the new biology: the fact that behavior
has a genetic basis, thus making it heritable and therefore subject to natural
selection; and the fact that behavior, or rather, particular behaviors, are
adaptive.... The genetic basis of hundreds and hundreds of particular
behaviors has been demonstrated beyond doubt, and the adaptive significance
of particular behaviors has been demonstrated in hundreds of cases [1971:
171].
Obviously, these two requirements are considerably easier to meet for
animal than for human behavior. The reader is advised to keep these
requirements in mind for the remainder of this discussion, for they are
often lost sight of in the excitement of theoretical speculation. Space does
not permit discussion of the process of evolution of behavior, but the
method is analogous in major respects to selection of physical structures
(Corning, 1971; Lockard, 1971).
AGGRESSION IN EARLY HUMANS
A great deal of controversy surrounds the nature of early human beings
and the relative role that aggression did or did not play in their evolution.
It is frequently assumed that the aggression displayed by present-day
humans evolved long ago because of its adaptiveness, but has recently
become increasingly dysfunctional in the modern world (Washburn, 1972;
Corning, 1971; Somit, 1968). However, opinion is by no means unanimous
that early man was very aggression-prone. I have already discussed Lorenz’
theory and critiques thereof, so I will briefly summarize a few propositions
of other writers.
Most spectacular, of course, is Robert Ardrey’s (1961) thesis that
humans evolved from &dquo;killer&dquo; prehominids, Australopithecus africanus,
with the further implication than man was born a killer. There has been
controversy surrounding whether Australopithecus used weapons for
predatory purposes and possibly even for intraspecies aggression, and
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further controversy concerning whether the species was even directly in
the line of human evolution. The latter question may now have been
resolved in the negative with the recent discovery by Richard Leakey’s
team of a skull far more similar to modem man’s (in terms of cranial
capacity) which antedates the earliest known Australopithecus species by
at least one million years. This suggests that Ardrey’s &dquo;killer apes&dquo; may
not be man’s ancestors at all, but rather an unsuccessful side branch in the
line of human evolution.
Fromm (1973: 41) criticizes S. L. Washburn’s theory that early hunting
man had a &dquo;carnivorous psychology&dquo; and &dquo;a drive for and pleasure in
killing,&dquo; although Fromm’s interpretation that the pleasure was not in the
killing but in the development of hunting skills is no more compelling than
Washburn’s. A number of theorists have tried to explain humans’
aggression and cruelty in terms of man’s &dquo;carnivorous and cannibalistic
origins&dquo; (Rapoport, 1965: 115). However, as Rapoport (1965: 115-116)
observes,
If we confine ourselves to man’s ’carnivorous psychology,’ we do not really
have an adequate explanation of man’s cruelty. When one speaks of man’s
inhumanity to man, one usually refers to intraspecific cruelty. There is no
evidence, however, that carnivores exhibit more intense intraspecific aggres-
sion than other mammals. Indeed, among the carnivores intraspecific fighting
is often highly ritualized and hardly ever lethal.
Further, Helmuth (1973) shows that the bases of cannibalism are most
often not aggressive, although they may be in some cases. They usually are
tied to religious or cultural beliefs and are often ceremonial. Also,
although his data are only of the most tentative sort, Helmuth shows that
exocannibalism may have developed out of endocannibalism, hardly
evidence for &dquo;aggressive&dquo; origins of the practice.
HUMAN AGGRESSION AND CONFLICT FROM THE
EVOLUTIONARY GENETICS VIEWPOINT
Here the concern is whether particular behavioral tendencies which are
assumed to have a genetic basis will be selected for or against in the
process of evolution. Aggression itself will be considered first, followed by
other characteristics which may have implications for aggression and
conflict.
Aggression. A number of authors believe that aggression would have
been of great adaptive value in human evolution (e.g., Coming, 1971;
Washburn, 1972). Part of the problem of evaluating such hypotheses stems
from definitions. If one expands the definition of aggression to be virtually
synonymous with assertiveness, as some authors do, then it is much easier
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to agree that &dquo;aggression&dquo; may have been adaptive. If, however, we use the
narrower definition (an act done with the intention of injuring persons or
damaging property), then the answer is not so clear. As Halleck (1971:
231) says, &dquo;It is relatively easy to make a case for man’s biological need
for initiative or assertiveness, but whether the tendency to hurt others is
instinctual is debatable.&dquo; Both Coming and Washbum, I believe, would
still insist that even the narrower form of aggression was adaptive. Other
authors (e.g., Klopfer, 1969), however, insist that aggression would have
been of little or no selective advantage, and that &dquo;it is at least equally
plausible that early man showed very little ’aggression’ 
&dquo; 
(Klopfer, 1969:
7). These positions may not be as diametrically opposed as they appear: it
is at least conceivable that the capacity for aggression could have been
selected for, but that its display was either infrequent or closely
determined by objective necessity only.
Small-group attachments. It is often pointed out that humans are social
animals, and that they are so by reason of biological predisposition
(Corning, 1971; Willhoite, 1971). However, others feel that this social
nature may have limitations. Washburn (1972) suggests that humans share
with other primates a biological predisposition toward attachments to
small rather than large groups, pointing out how orators use the rhetoric of
the family to encourage people to come to the aid of much larger groups.
Campbell (1972: 26-27) qualifies his main thesis (summarized in the next
section) by saying:
The kind of ’selfishness’ selected needs to be spelled out m more
detail.... Thus familial solidarity [i.e., sacrifice on behalf of one’s immediate
family] is selected for, but group solidarity on larger than family hnes that
involves much risk or sacrifice on the part of the cooperator is in general
selected against.... The degree of vertebrate sociality thus produced probably
reaches its limit in that found within packs of wolves and chimpanzees which
include several families, that is, a very limited degree of social mter-
dependence.
Altruism versus &dquo;selfishness. 
&dquo; The conventional wisdom used to be that
humans are innately selfish and that social and cultural mechanisms are
responsible for whatever cooperation or altruism exists. Then came the
&dquo;enlightened,&dquo; social-science-based view that humans are inherently
neither selfish nor cooperative but that they are shaped in either direction
(or both) by social forces. This was followed by the evolutionary-geneticist
view that humans are genetically predisposed toward sociability, coopera-
tion, and altruism. Now Campbell (1972) summarizes a more recent
evolutionary-geneticist argument that suggests that the conventional
wisdom was right all along but without knowing precisely why: namely,
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that humans are necessarily genetically predisposed toward &dquo;self-saving
cowardice&dquo; as opposed to &dquo;self-sacrificing altruism,&dquo; and that the
elaborate social and cultural mechanisms which are needed to overcome
this tendency are responsible for humans’ extraordinary degree of social
interdependence. This predisposition occurs because, where there is
&dquo;genetic competition&dquo; (involving genes for &dquo;altruism&dquo; and those for
&dquo;selfishness&dquo;) among cooperators, &dquo;there are stringent restraints against
genetic selection for self-sacrificial altruism&dquo; (1972: 26). Selection, then,
favors &dquo;self-saving cowardice,&dquo; provided that there is &dquo;a self-sacrificial
component to the bravery&dquo; (1972: 25). The only other species whose
degree of social interdependence even approaches that of humans are the
social insects, and this occurs because they are genetically predisposed
toward self-sacrificing altruism due to the lack of genetic competition
among cooperators (who are sterile). This is one of the rare cases in nature
which escapes the process of natural selection, since selective elimination
occurs to individuals different from those who reproduce.
Fear of novel stimuli. Dubos (1973) has suggested that mistrust and
fear of the foreigner or the stranger may have biological origins. A similar
but even broader idea is suggested in this quote from Bolles (1970: 33):
What keeps animals alive in the world is that they have very effective innate
defensive reactions which occur when they encounter any kind of new or
sudden stimulus. These defensive reactions vary somewhat from species to
species, but they generally take one of three forms: Animals generally run or
fly away, freeze, or adopt some type of threat, that is pseudo-aggressive
behavior.... The animal which survives is the one which comes into its
environment. with defensive reactions already a prominent part of its
repertoire.
A caveat. It must be remembered that, while selection acts upon
phenotypes, including behavior, transmission of characteristics involves
only genotypes. That is, behaviors may be selectively eliminated or
&dquo;encouraged&dquo; by the environment, but only genetic material is trans-
mitted. Thus, particular behaviors are &dquo;evolved&dquo; in the biologically
evolutionary sense only if they have a genetic basis. If they do not, then
their &dquo;selection&dquo; is, evolutionarily speaking, irrelevant. The theorizing
about human behavior in the preceding sections is dependent on the
assumption that each behavior in question has some genetic basis. Most of
these assumptions do not yet have a solid evidential foundation. Before
the authors’ hypotheses can be accepted, they must demonstrate, for each
behavior they discuss, that the behavior in question does indeed have some
genetic basis. It will not do to show that some behaviors have a genetic
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basis, or that behavior in general can, in principle, have a genetic basis.
There is a separate burden of proof for each behavior in question. Until
this can be convincingly demonstrated, the hypotheses must be regarded as
unverified. (A few theorists mention an apparent exception to my
strictures. The saving factor-or rationalization, depending upon one’s
viewpoint-is the so-called &dquo;Baldwin effect,&dquo; by which &dquo;natural selec-
tion ... favors genetic fixation of traits which a given environment induces
in the phenotype&dquo; [Dobzhansky, 1962: 289]. The evolutionists assure us
that this is not the same as Lysenkoism or Lamarckism [Corning, 1971].)
CONFLICT OVER SCARCE ESSENTIAL RESOURCES
There is at least one other, somewhat more indirect, way in which
biological factors can be said to underlie human conflict. In the course of
outlining a grand evolutionary theory of &dquo;all human life&dquo; Corning (1971 :
366) reminds us that the overriding goal of all organisms, including human
beings, is still survival. It may seem elementary to point out that survival
depends upon the satisfaction of biological needs, but in the context of
present and future world conditions-burgeoning populations, an overall
inadequate food supply, depletion of many natural resources, and
stagnating national economies-one can begin to see another way in which
biological factors may underlie conflicts. Such conditions will increasingly
lead to conflicts of interest over diminishing resources needed to satisfy
basic bodily needs, such as food and, in less temperate regions, fuel or
energy for warmth. These conflicts will occur between nations, between
classes, and even between individuals or families within classes. (In the
recent beef shortage, there was a race to the supermarket in order to
hoard. The slow got left out; the poor had no chance anyway.) The
fact-and the psychology-of scarcity can be expected to promote conflict.
HUMAN PHYSIOLOGY AND AGGRESSION
The past two decades have seen remarkable progress in human
physiology, much of which is relevant to the study of aggression. A great
deal of evidence indicates that the level of aggression displayed by
individuals, or their readiness to show aggression at all, depends in part on
the state of their nervous and endocrine systems. Once again, I can
mention only a few areas and those only in passing, but it should be
enough to give the reader a feel for some of the areas under study. I will
discuss work in three categories mentioned by Moyer (1973), plus a fourth
category suggested by Davies (1970).
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There are no data for humans comparable to those for animals showing
that aggression can be selectively bred for, but the belief persists that
differential aggressiveness in humans is to some unknown extent inherited.
On the genetics side, there have been claims, based largely on clinical
impressions, that XYY males are prone to extreme aggression and, as a
result, are overrepresented among criminals. However, Owen’s (1972: 224)
careful review of the evidence casts serious doubt on the validity of &dquo;the
’aggressive XYY’ stereotype.&dquo; One study (Price and Whatmore, 1967b)
even found that XYY’s had fewer crimes of violence than a suitably
matched control group (Owen, 1972: 255). Another study by the same
authors (Price and Whatmore, 1967a) found no differences in property
crime rates, but large differences in crimes against persons: although there
were no differences for murder rates, XY males greatly exceeded XYYs in
rates of assault and sexual assault. These findings illustrate the necessity
for careful and thorough research before public policy recommendations
are made (Somit, 1968).
NEURAL SYSTEMS AND THE BRAIN
Work seems to be proceeding rapidly on the mapping of brain-behavior
relationships. This is a highly complex area which I am not competent to
review adequately, and I refer the reader to Moyer (1971) and Delgado
(1969). The evidence is sufficient to lay to rest the notion that aggression
is wholly learned. Particularly impressive is Moyer’s (1971) delineation of
seven different types of aggression, each characterized by a particular
neural and endocrine pattern.
Another topic, indirectly related to aggressiveness, which has received a
great deal of recent publicity, is the phenomenon of the &dquo;minimal brain
dysfunction&dquo; (MBD) child. The unusual thing about this disorder is that it
is diagnosed behaviorally, on the basis of &dquo;hyperactivity,&dquo; rather than
biologically, since direct evidence of organic disorder has not been found.
Large numbers of children have been diagnosed as having this syndrome
and are being given daily drug treatment of stimulants (which have the
paradoxical effect of calming such children). This practice has come in for
harsh criticism, partly because so little of a physiological or biochemical
nature is actually known about the syndrome, and partly because diagnosis
on the basis of behavior may be highly subjective, and may in some cases
simply be an expedient way of controlling unruly children who may or
may not have a physiological problem (Chorover, 1973).
Research on the relationship between the brain and aggression is
becoming increasingly controversial because of its implication for &dquo;con-
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trolling&dquo; aggression. Writers in this area often slide easily from discussions
of cause-and-effect relationships to recommendations for methods of
control, with only the most perfunctory or bland references to ethical
considerations (Moyer is an exception to this pattern, but he still comes
down on the side of control). Frequently proposed techniques for
controlling aggression include (a) psychosurgery (for opposing views on
this volatile issue, see Mark and Ervin, 1970, for the pro-surgery side; and
for the anti-surgery arguments, see Chorover, 1973; Trotter, 1973a; and
almost anything by Peter Breggin); and (b) electrical stimulation of
aggression-inhibiting neural systems in the brain (perhaps by means of an
already-operational radio receiver-transmitter which can be implanted in
the brain for the purpose of monitoring a person’s whereabouts and
delivering shocks if he shows signs of becoming hostile or aggressive; see
Ingraham and Smith, 1972). The so-called &dquo;side effects&dquo;’ of these
techniques often do not receive as much attention as is warranted.
BLOOD CHEMISTRY AND ENDOCRINE SYSTEMS
The field of psychopharmacology is obviously highly relevant to the
study of aggression. Once again I will not attempt to summarize this area
and will instead refer the reader to other sources: Somit (1968), for a good
layman’s introduction; Kumar et al. (1970), for a more technical,
thorough treatment; Crane (1973), for a discussion of some of the field’s
shortcomings and unintended consequences; and Warren (1973, 1972), for
an account of public and professional reaction to the proposal by a recent
president of the American Psychological Association that world leaders be
given pacifying drugs in order to save humanity from certain destruction.
Also indicative of work in this general area are two other studies.
Persky et al. (1971) discovered a close relationship in young men between
testosterone levels and psychological measures of aggression and hostility.
And ethnologist Ralph Bolton has found at least preliminary evidence
among the Qolla (an Andean subculture in Peru and Bolivia) that their
extreme aggression may be related to chronic hypoglycemia (abnormally
low glucose level in the blood; Trotter, 1973b).
DIFFUSE BIOLOGICALLY BASED NEEDS
In this residual category belong a number of supposedly universal and
inherent needs. Davies (1970: 617) includes among them the &dquo;substan-
7. "When we think in terms of systems, we see that a fundamental misconception
is embedded in the popular term ’side-effects.’ ... This phrase means roughly ’effects
which I hadn’t foreseen, or don’t want to think about.’ As concerns the basic
mechanism, side-effects no more deserve the adjective ’side’ than does the ’principal’
effect. It is hard to think in terms of systems, and we eagerly warp our language to
protect ourselves from the necessity of doing so" (Hardin, 1969: 291).
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tive&dquo; needs of the familiar Maslow hierarchy (&dquo;the physical needs, the
social-affectional or love needs, the self-esteem or dignity needs, and the
self-actualization needs&dquo;) as well as three &dquo;implemental&dquo; needs: &dquo;the needs
for knowledge, security, and for control or power.&dquo; What is innate, says
Davies, are these basic needs plus the tendency to fulfill them, not the
tendency to fulfill them violently. His basic model is a version of the
&dquo;frustration-aggression&dquo; theory: &dquo;The basic needs that all human beings
have in common are fundamental instigators to an action sequence which,
when severely frustrated, is likely to produce aggression, including political
violence when government is blamed for the frustration&dquo; (1970: 618).
Unfortunately, he says, we do not yet know enough &dquo;to establish either
the loci, the circuitry, or the glands in the nervous and endocrine systems
where the basic needs of man generate and function&dquo; (1970: 622).
BIOLOGICAL FACTORS AND WAR
It would be a great oversight for this review not to give some special
attention to the problem of war, one of the central concerns of this
journal. It has already been established that research on animal behavior
has little or no relevance to human warfare, first because there are no
adequate homologues or even analogues to it among nonhuman species
(Scott, 1969), and second because of the inadmissibility, even if such
similarities did exist, of direct extrapolations from one species to another.
Even at the human level, individual aggression is not even a necessary,
let alone sufficient, cause of warfare. War does not result from the
outpouring of individual aggression, whether instinctual or not. It is
planned and coordinated rather than expressive and is intended, at least, to
be highly instrumental, even when fighting is over symbols rather than
material interests. This orientation is epitomized by the Clausewitzian
dictum that war is an extension of diplomacy by other means (see
Rapoport, 1966). Wars are not products of personal aggression, although
individual acts in the course of a war may be triggered by certain
immediate conditions tapping into a possibly &dquo;biologically programmed&dquo;
source of aggressive behavior. It is well known that it is even possible for
large aggregations of individuals to carry out acts of violence and
destruction without any feelings of aggressiveness or hostility (Kelman,
1973; Sanford and Comstock, 1971). Indeed, to some who think of
aggression in the broad sense of initiative and assertiveness, it may be a
force for life rather than death.
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The real responsibility for war lies in the tendency to follow society’s demands
quietly, through repetitive roles, following the line of least resistance in the
service of some ideal of nation, race, class, etc. The army recruit is following
the line of least social resistance.... However, the young man who refuses to
fight is actually the most aggressive m this situation. He will encounter more
social tension, standmg as a self against society [Agel, 1972: 118].
Rapoport (1965: 116) summarizes the viewpoint that war is not the
result of individual aggression.
We see how the problem of war can confuse analysis, for example by making
’fighting’ and ’warmaking’ appear practically synonymous in spite of the
fact that there may be only a remote connection between them. We say that
boys fight and also that nations fight. Having identified the two manifestations
of aggression, we seek mechanisms common to both types of fighting. There
may or may not be such common mechanisms. Or there may once have been
common mechanisms underlymg both individual aggression and warmalong-
mechanisms that no longer exist. Certainly a personal predilection for overt
aggression is no longer the mark of the warrior. Indeed, the warnor himself is
about to disappear as a component of a nation’s warmaking apparatus. He
seems to have been replaced by the strategist, the scientist and the techmcian.
It is not obvious that people in these roles have greater propensities for
fighting than other people. Yet when and if the time comes, theu activities
will result in more bloodshed than those of the combmed hordes of Attila,
Genghis Khan and Adolf Hitler.
Wars occur because they are thought to be useful in attaining certain
goals (Scott, 1973) such as material interests and sovereignty, or other
symbolic goals such as saving face, maintaining a particular image in the
world, or advancing an ideology. In the latter connection, Kenneth
Boulding has said, with characteristic hyperbole, &dquo;The only religion that
still demands human sacrifice is nationalism.&dquo;8 Recall that while some
evolutionary biologists have proposed that humans are biologically
predisposed to strong attachment to ethical and ideological beliefs
(Waddington, 1960), others have come to believe that selection does not
favor tendencies toward sacrifice on behalf of such beliefs (Campbell,
1972). This may be cause for qualified optimism:
Accepting the conclusion that man’s termite- and ant-like capacity for military
heroism is in culturally transmitted dispositions, not genetic ones, makes me
more optimistic about the possibilities of social mventions ehmmatmg war, for
such developments will have the temptations of biological selfishness on their
side. However resistent [sic] culture is to change, it is probably less so than
the gene pool.... These optimistic observations do not of course limply
optimism about the organizational future of those societies which are first to
8. In a lecture at the University of Michigan, January 28, 1969.
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lose the archaic capacity to fight wars, for until all nations have achieved this
state of intelligent cultural decay, those that achieve it first will be at a
decided disadvantage in international competition [Campbell, 1972: 34-35
CONCLUSIONS
THE APPLICABILITY OF BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES
TO HUMAN CONFLICT
It is difficult to generalize about approaches which vary as widely as
those presented here. (Remember also that &dquo;biological&dquo; does not
necessarily mean &dquo;innate&dquo; or &dquo;immutable&dquo;-biological factors may be the
result of experience or interaction with the environment.) However, I
think it can be said that a valid case has been begun for the applicability of
biological approaches to conflict, or at least aggression. But the question is
not really whether-that answer has to be in the affirmative-but rather
how much. How relatively important are biological factors compared to
others discussed in this review? Given the current state of still-limited
knowledge, one’s answer is likely to be highly subjective, not unlike an
assessment of whether a partial glass of water is half full or half empty. In
addition, such an evaluation depends heavily on the type of aggression
being considered-in the case of war, biological factors probably have no
causal importance, whereas in cases of, say, wife-beating or child abuse,
their influence may be considerable. However, despite these difficulties,
we do know enough to at least put the problem in some kind of
perspective.
What are the criteria by which we can evaluate a theory? At a
minimum, we can list the following: (a) Other things being equal, are the
propositions true with regard to the phenomena chosen for explanation?
(b) Other things not being equal, how &dquo;powerful&dquo; are the effects
hypothesized? Are they &dquo;robust&dquo; or, instead, more subtle and &dquo;override-
able&dquo; by other effects? If they are true, are they the whole truth? (c) What
is the scope of application? How wide a range of phenomena can the
propositions accurately account for? How ubiquitous are the hypothesized
effects-are they all-pervasive, or do they occur only under certain
conditions? (Some might include parsimony as a criterion, but in many
cases this may be more an epistemological, stylistic preference than an
essential requirement for adequately understanding a phenomenon.)
With these criteria in mind, let us try to put the biologically oriented
approaches to behavior into perspective. Table 1, adapted from Scott
(1969) with only slight revisions for applicability to human as well as
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TABLE 1
THEORETICAL FACTORS AFFECTING BEHAVIOR
SOURCE : Scott (1969), with minor revisions.
animal behavior, shows the range of factors that must be considered in
trying to account for behavior. Behavior is affected by factors at each
level, but, in addition, &dquo;there are influences that are not apparent from
this scheme and which act at every level of organization-the evolutionary
history of the species and the developmental history of the individual&dquo;
(Scott, 1969: 134).
In this larger context and in light of the theoretical criteria listed above,
it should be fairly clear that purely biological approaches to the study of
human conflict will in general have some, but quite limited, applicability.
Their contribution to knowledge in this area is probably greater than most
social scientists would care to admit, but considerably less than is claimed
by many of their advocates. Much of their knowledge is sound, but taken
apart from knowledge in a great number of other areas, it paints at best
incomplete and at worst fatally misleading pictures of the nature of human
conflict. The only sort of biologically oriented approach that has any
hopes of even coming close to adequately accounting for human conflict
might be something of the order of Corning’s (1971) ambitious
evolutionary-based theory, but even it has a number of blind spots.
Any biologically based approach that aspires to an adequate explana-
tion of human conflict must of necessity be an amalgam of social,
psychological, and biological factors (probably with the biological factors
as mediating variables or mechanisms for social and psychological stimuli).
This is so because there are a priori logical reasons why purely biological
approaches are doomed to limited applicability. First, they cannot
adequately account even for the behavior of individuals, as we have seen in
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this review. And furthermore, even if they could, social relationships and
processes such as conflict cannot be explained in terms of individual
characteristics or properties. For example, commenting on the relevance of
several earlier psychological works on personal aggression for the study of
international conflict, Daniel Katz (1961: 70-71) states:
Interesting as these contributions are, I believe they are not central to an
explanation of violent conflict between nations. They help in our understand-
ing of why violence is part of the behavioral repertoire of human beings but
they have nothing to say about particular forms of group action which involve
the use of violence. Conflict between nations cannot be equated to conflict
between individuals. Too many other variables are involved in international
conflict to consider it as the sum of the aggressive tendencies of individual
citizens. The properties of a social system are not found by the simple
addition of the properties of individual component members. These properties
are the result of the complex interaction of people engaged in the many role
relationships of national systems and sub-systems. In other words, our actions
in the roles we play in a social system are limited and determined by the role
requirements of the system and are not the direct reflection of our own
personality needs and desires.9
I mention these issues because the momentum which the biological
approaches are picking up is tempered only slightly by any professed
recognition of where they actually fit in the larger picture. (There are
laudable exceptions-e.g., Alland, Scott, and Coming, to mention just a
few.) There seems to be a pattern within many disciplines that, when a
prevailing one-sided or incomplete paradigm is overtaken by a challenging
school of thought, the new orthodoxy is often as extreme in the opposite
direction as was the original. &dquo;One mark of the profoundly influential
social theory seems to be its strong biases. To reorder our thinking, to
shake loose from customary strictures, large segments of reality must be
sacrificed&dquo; (Gergen, 1973: 306). One might say that, following every
paradigm, there is an equal and opposite counter-paradigm. If one is to
believe Davies (1970), a biologically naive environmentalism flowing out
of Locke and Marx has been the prevailing orthodoxy in the social sciences
until recently (psychology has been an exception, at least with regard to
its view of real-world problems; see Caplan and Nelson, 1973). If
9. Similarly, Feibleman (1973: 8) says: "Recent studies of the integrative levels
show that the cumulative upward accumulation of properties, including qualities,
cannot be reversed. The higher structures are built on the lower, but they cannot be
reduced to the lower. Molecules contain atoms, cells contain molecules, organisms
contain cells, but molecules cannot be reduced to atoms any more than cells can be
reduced to molecules or organisms reduced to cells. The qualities which emerge at
each of these levels is [sic] also irreducible."
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enthusiasm rather than sagacity carries the day with regard to the
biological approaches, we may simply be in the process of &dquo;[replacing]
one form of determinism with another&dquo; (Somit, 1968: 561). Severin
(1971) postulates a predictable sequence which &dquo;models of man&dquo; undergo
in the course of psychological research. They start out, he says, as guides
for certain areas of research; before long they are considered an adequate
description of human beings; and finally they become &dquo;dogmas about
what people are really like&dquo; (1971: 1). However, responsible contribu-
tions, both to theory and to society, necessitate rejecting the Law of the
Instrument (Kaplan, 1964; Caplan and Nelson, 1973) as an operating
principle, and becoming &dquo;interdisciplinary&dquo; in ways which many of us had
not even considered until now and which make earlier uses of that term
now seem ironically truncated.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES
TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR
Some comments are in order regarding the positive contributions of the
biologically oriented approaches to human behavior as they are presently
formulated.
(1) They make up a fast-developing set of interrelated fields capable of
drawing upon each other and which show great promise for shedding more
light on the biological inputs to a wide range of human behavior.
(2) By reminding us all of our basically biological nature, they
destroyed the, at times, smug complacency of the &dquo;oversocialized&dquo;
conceptions of humans (Wrong, 1963). Although it may seem &dquo;logical to
say that social facts can be accounted for only by antecedent social facts&dquo;
(Washburn, 1972: 35), this can no longer be automatically assumed. Social
scientists can no longer ignore or avoid biologically oriented approaches to
human behavior, for the battle has been carried to our domain (territory?),
and the ranks of these approaches are swelling. They are at the parapets,
and we had better decide soon whether to join them, fight them, or,
perhaps better, establish diplomatic negotiations that will be critically
constructive to both sides.
(3) In a closely related vein, these approaches have demonstrated the
necessity for social scientists to &dquo;tool-up&dquo; on biological matters, and for
some of the biological advocates to &dquo;rigor-ize&dquo; their logic and to become
more aware of social factors. It is difficult to say which side’s needs are
greater. The dialogue between the two camps now suffers from a tendency
toward bifurcation: many of those who are trained in biological areas are
inclined to be less critical than they should be toward application of
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biological concepts to other areas, while many of those who are
predisposed to be skeptical about such applications do not have the
necessary skills and knowledge to adequately criticize them. There are an
encouraging number of individuals in the middle ground, but there should
be more. In short, we need more technical competence in biological
matters by social scientists, and a less evangelistic, more self-critical
approach by those already competent.
(4) The relationships between &dquo;innate&dquo; and &dquo;acquired&dquo; factors have
been clarified and sharpened somewhat, thereby demonstrating that
neither is quite as pure a concept as its respective proponents had thought.
(5) The biological approaches have sparked great new public interest in
the study of human origins. The challenge remains, however, as to whether
the facts can be responsibly communicated or whether the public will be
pandered to with myths of &dquo;killer ape&dquo; ancestors and such.
(6) These approaches have clarified relationships between species and
have shown the true relevance of animal behavior studies for human
behavior: namely, for hypothesis-generating and method-sharpening
(Lockard, 1971), rather than direct extrapolation of results.
(7) Finally, the biological approaches have served to remind us of our
place in nature: we are in a very rough continuum of animal life,
significantly but not wholly different from other animals, an intrinsic part
and product of nature. As Julian Huxley optimistically put it:
Only if we know and face the truth about the world, whether the world of
physics and chemistry, or of geology and biology, or of mind and behavior,
shall we be able to see what is our own place in that world. Only as we
discover and assimilate the truth about nature shall we be able to undertake
the apparently contradictory task of re-establishing our unity with nature
while at the same time maintaining our transcendence over nature [quoted in
Somit, 1968: 553].
Embeddedness in and transcendence above nature-yet another human
dilemma, and a peculiarly bittersweet one, as Shepard and McKinley
(1969: 13-14) remind us.
Men hail the freedom which raises them above animals. Our consciousness is
deeper, the bondage to instinct is loosened, the limitations to place are
transcended. And then there is the dream of ultimate freedom from nature
itself which would be the next logical step, for the physical world seems to
exert a kind of tyranny.
But this idea of tyranny misuses both ideology and nature. The uniqueness of
the human species is not a great political triumph, but is itself nature. It has a
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biological basis and an evolutionary background. To understand human
freedom is to discover its limitations....
If freedom for us be choice of action guided by knowledge, we are in a strange
paradoxical situation. For our knowledge of the intricacy of life and of our
ability to destroy it links us by a thousand new ecological strands to the most
minute as well as the grandest aspects of our world. In our freedom is a burden
if not a bondage that no monkey was ever asked to bear.
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